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The Full Picture: Preliminary Examinations at the International Criminal Court 
Sara Wharton and Rosemary Grey 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) at the International Criminal Court (ICC) has described 
preliminary examinations as “one of the Office’s three core activities,” alongside investigating and 
prosecuting crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.1 In the fifteen years since the first prosecutor 
took office, the Office has opened 27 preliminary examinations, the most recent concerning crimes 
allegedly committed in the Philippines and Venezuela, as announced on 8 February 2018,2 and the 
alleged deportation of Rohingya people from Myanmar to Bangladesh, announced on 18 September 
2018.3 In the ICC’s early years, there was little public information about this important aspect of the 
OTP’s work. As a result, the significance of preliminary examinations was not widely appreciated 
outside the Court, and there was little research on this pre-investigative process.4 However, this began 
to change with increased public reporting on preliminary examinations by the OTP, and greater 
attention to this topic in media reporting on the Court. In fact, these days the mere decision to open a 
preliminary examination can have a significant impact, including prompting two states (Burundi and 
the Philippines) to withdraw from the ICC’s founding treaty, the 1998 Rome Statute.5  Additionally, 
 
1 ICC-OTP, OTP Strategic Plan: 2016-2018, 16 November 2015, online: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/en-
otp_strategic_plan_2016-2018.pdf> (accessed 16 August 2018) at para. 55 [2016-2018 Strategic Plan]. 
2 ICC-OTP, “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mrs Fatou Bensouda, on opening 
Preliminary Examinations into the situation in the Philippines and Venezuela”, 8 February 2018, online: 
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180208-otp-stat> (accessed 31 August 2018) [Statement of OTP on 
opening Philippines and Venezuela II Preliminary Examinations]. 
3 ICC-OTP, “Fatou Bensouda, on opening a Preliminary Examination concerning the alleged deportation of the 
Rohingya people from Myanmar to Bangladesh”, 18 September 2018, online: <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180918-ot-stat-Rohingya> (accessed 7 November 2018) [Statement of OTP on opening 
Rohingya/Myanmar Preliminary Examination]. 
4 For some earlier work, see Héctor Olásolo, “The prosecutor of the ICC before the initiation of investigations: A quasi-
judicial or a political body?” (2003) 3:2 Intl Crim L Rev 87; Ignaz Stegmiller, The Pre-Investigative Stage of the ICC: Criteria for 
Situation Selection (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2011). 
5 “Burundi”, ICC Website, online: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/burundi> (accessed 4 August 2008); ICC, “ICC Statement 
on The Philippines’ notice of withdrawal: State participation in Rome Statute system essential to international rule of 
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preliminary examinations have, in recent years, been identified as an important area of research6 
leading to a recent thought-provoking collection of essays on preliminary examinations7 together with  
useful analyses of discrete parts of the preliminary examination puzzle, including the process for 
opening a preliminary examination,8 the purpose of preliminary examinations,9 their duration,10 how 
the principles of complementarity,11 “positive complementarity”12, and gravity13 function at this stage 
of proceedings, and the limited scope for judicial review in preliminary examinations.14  
Missing from this literature is a comprehensive picture of the practice of the ICC Prosecutor 
in relation to all preliminary examinations opened thus far. Filling that gap, this article provides an in-
depth analysis of all preliminary examinations up until the 2018 annual preliminary examinations 
report. It reviews legal decisions made at the preliminary examination stage, and identifies patterns in 
 
law”, 20 March 2018, ICC-CPI-20180320-PR1371. See also Rosemary Grey and Sara Wharton, “Lifting the Curtain: 
Opening a Preliminary Examination at the International Criminal Court” (2018) 16:3 J Intl Criminal Justice 593. 
6 For example, the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies held an expert seminar on preliminary examinations on 
29 September 2015. See Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, “Preliminary Examinations and 
Legacy/Sustainable Exit: Reviewing Policies and Practices”, online: <http://postconflictjustice.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/Report-Preliminary-Examination-and-Legacy_Sustainable-Exit_Reviewing-Policies-and-
Practices.pdf> (accessed 25 March 2018) [“Grotius Centre Report”]. 
7 Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn, eds, Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations (Vol. 1 & 2) (Brussels: Torkel 
Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2018). 
8 Grey and Wharton, supra note 5. 
9 E.g. Carsten Stahn, “Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t, Challenges and Critiques of Preliminary 
Examinations at the ICC” (2017) 15 J Intl Criminal Justice 413; Mark Kersten, “‘Casting a Larger Shadow’: Pre-
meditated Madness, the International Criminal Court, and Preliminary Examinations” in Morten Bergsmo and Carsten 
Stahn, eds, Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations (Vol. 2) Chapter 33 (Brussels: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 
2018) 655. 
10 E.g. Anni Pues, “Towards the ‘Golden Hour’? A Critical Exploration of the Length of Preliminary Examinations” 
(2017) 15:3 J Intl Criminal Justice 435; Stahn, supra note 9, at 428-29; Mark Kersten, “How Long can the ICC Keep 
Palestine and Israel in Purgatory?” (29 February 2016), Justice in Conflict (blog), online: 
<https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/02/29/how-long-can-the-icc-keep-palestine-and-israel-in-purgatory/> (accessed 25 
March 2018). 
11 E.g. Louise Chappell, Rosemary Grey and Emily Waller, “The Gender Justice Shadow of Complementarity: Lessons 
from the International Criminal Court’s Preliminary Examinations in Guinea and Colombia” (2013) 7:2 I J Transitional 
Justice 455. 
12 Justine Tillier, “The ICC Prosecutor and Positive Complementarity: Strengthening the Rule of Law?” (2013) 13:3 Intl 
Crim L Rev 507 at 511-552; Amrita Kapur, “The Value of International-National Interactions and Norm Interpretations 
in Catalysing National Prosecutions of Sexual Violence” (2016) 6(1) Oñati Socio-Legal Series. 
13 E.g. Alette Smeulers, Maartje Weerdesteijn and Barbara Hola, “The Selection of Situations by the ICC: An Empirically 
Based Evaluation of the OTP’s Performance” (2015) 15:1 Intl Crim L Rev 1; Margaret M. deGuzman, “Gravity and the 
Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court” (2009) 32:5 Fordham Intl L J 1400 at 1409-1415; Stahn, supra note 9, at 
426-27. 
14 E.g. Stahn, supra note 9, at 430-32.  
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the triggers, outcomes, duration, frequency, and geographic representation of all preliminary 
examinations under the leadership of its two different prosecutors, Luis Moreno-Ocampo (June 2003 
– June 2012) and Fatou Bensouda (June 2012 – present). This in-depth analysis shows that, despite 
not having full investigatory powers during preliminary examinations, the OTP is very active during 
this phase. It interacts with a wide range of domestic and international actors, including state parties, 
non-party states, the United Nations (UN) Security Council, and members of civil society.  It also 
makes decisions on legal issues that go to the heart of the ICC’s work, including questions about the 
ICC’s jurisdiction and about the definition of crimes which are yet to be interpreted by judges of the 
Court. As such, preliminary examinations form a major part of the OTP’s work, demanding significant 
time and resources, and cannot be overlooked when evaluating the Court.   
Paying close attention to what goes on during the preliminary examination stage is therefore 
crucial to understanding what the OTP does, and sheds light on why certain crimes are later 
investigated and prosecuted by the ICC, while others are not. It provides insight into who seeks to 
“use” the court by triggering preliminary examinations and their success in doing so, as well as whether 
or not that usage has changed over the lifespan of the court as it has faced challenges and criticisms. 
Finally, understanding the full picture of the OTP’s preliminary examination practice is critical to 
understanding and nuancing many debates surrounding the legitimacy of the Court including its 
independence, impartiality, efficiency, and transparency.15 The currency date of the 2018 Preliminary 
Examination Report (specifically, 30 November 2018) provides a useful marker for a study of the 
OTP’s preliminary examination practice thus far.16 Of course, there are and always will be new 
developments to this practice as the OTP continues its work. However, this study demonstrate trends 
 
15 As Stahn notes, preliminary examinations “have a key role to play in relation to the legitimacy and perception of 
justice”, ibid at 415. 
16 ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2018, 5 December 2018, online: <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/itemsDocuments/181205-rep-otp-PE-ENG.pdf> (accessed 5 December 2018) at para. 17 [2018 PE Report]. 
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over more than fifteen years of OTP practice, and will provide a point of comparison for future 
research in the area, perhaps in another fifteen years. 
The article begins by introducing the legal regime governing preliminary examinations, and 
outlines relevant policies published by the OTP.  It then presents our study of the OTP’s preliminary 
examination practice to date, beginning with the method, and then presenting and discussing our key 
findings.  
 
II. WHAT IS A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION? 
Put simply, a preliminary examination is the “pre-investigative phase” of the OTP’s work.17 More 
specifically, it is the initial filtering process that the ICC prosecutor undertakes in order to decide 
whether or not there is a “reasonable basis to proceed to an investigation” by considering the factors 
listed in article 53(1) of the Rome Statute, namely: whether the information available provides a 
reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction has been or is being committed; 
whether the potential cases would be admissible before the ICC; and whether an investigation would 
not serve the interests of justice.18  
The question of precisely what activities constitute a preliminary examination, as opposed to a 
“pre-preliminary examination” process, is the subject of some debate. This debate arose recently in 
the ICC proceedings regarding a possible investigation into crimes allegedly committed in Myanmar 
and Bangladesh. In its September 2018 decision on that matter, Pre-Trial Chamber I held that: “the 
preliminary examination is the pre-investigative assessment through which the Prosecutor analyses the 
seriousness of the information ‘received’ or ‘made available’ to her against the factors set out in article 
 
17 ICC-OTP, Annex to the ‘Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor’: Referrals and Communications, online: 
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/278614ED-A8CA-4835-B91D-
DB7FA7639E02/143706/policy_annex_final_210404.pdf> (accessed 16 August 2018) at 3-4 [Annex to 2003 Policy 
Paper]. 
18 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence at Rule 48 [ICC RPE]. 
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53(1)(a)-(c) of the  Statute.”19 Applying that interpretation, it held that the Prosecutor’s actions in 
receiving information on alleged crimes against the Rohingya people, and considering “at least in part” 
that information against the factors described in article 53(1)(a)-(c), “do not precede a preliminary 
examination, but are part of it”.20 By contrast, the Prosecutor’s view was that those activities occurred 
in a pre-preliminary examination stage that the OTP describes as “Phase 1” of its four stage “filtering 
process” during which it conducts its “initial assessment of all information on alleged crimes received 
under article 15”.21 Thus, the OTP does not consider the “formal commencement of a preliminary 
examination” to occur until Phase 2 of this process.22 
This divergence in views is unsurprising, given the lack of clarity on this stage of proceedings 
in the Rome Statute. Despite being a core component of the OTP’s work, the term “preliminary 
examination” appears just once in the Statute. Specifically, article 15(6) refers to “the preliminary 
examination referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2” which state, respectively, that the Prosecutor may 
initiate investigations proprio motu (on his or her own motion) on the basis of information on crimes 
within the ICC’s jurisdiction, and that he or she may also seek out information from any “reliable 
sources”.23 If the Prosecutor seeks to proceed to an investigation proprio motu, he or she must apply to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber for authorization to open an investigation.24 On the other hand, if the 
prosecutor received a referral from either the UN Security Council or a state party, the Prosecutor 
may proceed from a preliminary examination straight to an investigation if he or she decides that the 
article 53(1) criteria are satisfied.  
 
19 ICC, Request Under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, “Decision on the ‘Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on 
Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute”, p-T. Ch. I, 6 September 2018, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-37 at para. 82. 
20 Ibid (emphasis added). 
21 2018 PE Report, supra n 16, at para. 15; ICC, Request Under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, “Prosecution 
Response to Observations by Intervening Participants”, OTP, 11 July 2018, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-33, at fn 10. See also 
Grey and Wharton supra note 5. 
22 2018 PE Report, supra note 16. 
23 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1997, 2187 UNTS 3 [Rome Statute]. 
24 Ibid, Articles 15(3) and (4). 
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If the Prosecutor reaches the conclusion that the article 53(1) criteria have not been met, he or 
she must notify the information provider, be it an individual, non-governmental organization (NGO), 
state, or the Security Council, of that conclusions and the supporting reasons.25 If the situation was 
referred by a state party or the Security Council, that referring entity can ask the Pre-Trial Chamber 
to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed.26 However, the power of judicial review here is 
very limited, despite the fact that the Prosecutor will inevitably have to make many important legal 
and factual determinations at this stage. The referring entity is not entitled to judicial review as a right,27 
and the Chamber cannot quash the Prosecutor’s decision even if it is deemed unreasonable or errant; 
at most, it can ask the Prosecutor to “reconsider”.28 On the other hand, if the conclusion not to 
proceed to an investigation is made on the basis of article 53(1)(c), namely that prosecution(s) would 
not be “in the interests of justice”, the OTP must inform the Pre-Trial Chamber.29 This provides the 
only basis upon which the Pre-Trial Chamber can review the Prosecutor’s decision on its own initiative 
and must confirm that decision for it to be effective.30 Finally, article 15 of the Rome Statute explicitly 
states that a decision to close a preliminary examination “shall not preclude the Prosecutor from 
considering further information submitted to him or her regarding the same situation in light of new 
facts or evidence.”31 Thus, the Prosecutor may re-open a preliminary examination at any time in light 
of new evidence, which has occurred only once thus far. 
Given the limited statutory guidance on the conduct of preliminary examinations, it is helpful 
to consider relevant policies produced by the OTP which, while not binding, are key to understanding 
the Office’s approach to this area of its practice. First, in a September 2003 document, the OTP made 
 
25 Ibid, Article 15(6); ICC RPE, supra note 18, Rules 105 and 49. 
26 Rome Statute, supra note 23, Article 53(3)(a). 
27 Ibid (“At the request of the State making a referral under article 14 or the Security Council under article 13, paragraph 
(b), the Pre-Trial Chamber may review a decision of the Prosecutor …”) [emphasis added]. 
28 Ibid.  
29 See also ICC, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09, 23 April 2009, Regulation 31. 
30 Rome Statute, supra note 23, Article 53(3)(b). 
31 Ibid, Article 15(6). 
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clear that a preliminary examination is always required before the Prosecutor can proceed to an 
investigation, even if the situation was referred by a state party or the UN Security Council (even 
though the term “preliminary examination” only appears in the statutory provision dealing with 
investigation initiated by the Prosecutor proprio motu).32 
 In November 2013, the OTP published a final Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations,33 which 
was based on an early October 2010 draft.34 This 2013 Policy Paper outlines the principles that guide 
the OTP in its preliminary examinations, namely: independence, impartiality and objectivity.35 It also 
articulates the four-phase process that the Office applies in conducting preliminary examinations, 
namely: examining article 15 communications from states, civil society and individuals  to rule out 
those that fall “manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Court” (Phase 1); determining whether or not 
the alleged crimes appear to fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC (Phase 2); determining whether or 
not the potential cases would be admissible to the Court (Phase 3); and determining whether or not 
an investigation would be against the “interests of justice” (Phase 4).36 The Policy Paper states that 
those criteria of “jurisdiction”, “admissibility”, and the “interests of justice” are assessed in the same 
manner regardless of the trigger for the preliminary examination.37 It also states that the OTP will 
publish regular reports on its preliminary examination activities, in line with its commitment to 
transparency at the preliminary examination stage.38  
 
32 See Annex to 2003 Policy Paper, supra note 17, at 3-4. 
33 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, online: <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-policy_paper_preliminary_examinations_2013-eng.pdf> (accessed 4 August 2018) at para. 77 
[PE Policy Paper]. 
34 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations: DRAFT, 4 October 2010, The Hague, online: <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/9ff1eaa1-41c4-4a30-a202-
174b18da923c/282515/otp_draftpolicypaperonpreliminaryexaminations04101.pdf> (accessed 17 August 2018). 
35 PE Policy Paper, supra note 33, at paras 25-33. 
36 Ibid at paras 77-83. 
37 Ibid at para. 35. 
38 Ibid at paras 94-9. 
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 In addition to that specific policy paper, a number of other OTP policies are also relevant to 
the preliminary examination process. For example, in September 2007, the OTP produced its Policy 
Paper on the Interests of Justice which guides the OTP’s consideration of this criteria under article 53(1)(c) 
of the Rome Statute.39 As well, the OTP’s June 2014 Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes40 and 
2016 Policy on Children41 inform the conduct and focus of preliminary examinations. This is apparent, 
for example, in the OTP’s statement that it will pay “particular attention to the commission of sexual 
and gender-based crimes at all stages of its work”, including at the preliminary examination phase.42 
Furthermore, these policy papers provide guidance as to how the relevant criteria should be analyzed, 
such as the assessment of the genuineness of national proceedings for the purposes of determining 
admissibility,43 the gravity threshold (noting that sexual and gender-based crimes as well as crimes 
against children are particularly grave),44 and the interests of justice criterion.45  
 Finally, a number of the strategic goals delineated in the OTP’s most recent Strategic Plan are 
relevant to preliminary examinations, such as Strategic Goal 3 which includes: developing the 
contribution that preliminary examinations can make to future investigations and prosecutions, 
promoting national proceedings, continuing its policy of increased transparency for preliminary 
examinations, enhancing the deterrent effect of preliminary examinations, and timely completion of 
preliminary examinations.46 
 
39 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, 2007, online: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-
4321-BF09-73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf> (accessed 17 August 2018). 
40 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, June 2014, online: <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-policy-paper-on-sexual-and-gender-based-crimes--june-2014.pdf> (accessed 17 August 2018), 
paras 38-47 [Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes]. 
41 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Children, November 2016, online: <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/20161115_otp_icc_policy-on-children_eng.pdf> (accessed 17 August 2018) at paras 53-61 [Policy 
on Children]. 
42 Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, supra note 39, at 5. 
43 Ibid at para. 41. 
44 Ibid at para. 45; Policy on Children, supra note 41, at para. 57. 
45 Policy on Children, supra note 41, at para. 59. 
46 2016-2018 Strategic Plan, supra note 1, at para. 55. 
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That, in brief, is the framework governing preliminary examinations. But how has this 
framework been applied in the 15 years since the first Prosecutor took office at the ICC? That question 
is the starting point for our study, the method and findings of which are detailed below. 
 
III. RESEARCH METHOD 
For this study, we conducted a review of all preliminary examinations opened by the ICC Prosecutor 
up until the 2018 Preliminary Examination Report (specifically, 30 November 2018). As noted above, 
the question of when a preliminary examination begins – and therefore, how many preliminary 
examination have been “opened” – is the subject of debate. However, for this study, we have counted 
only those situations in which the OTP has acknowledged that a “preliminary examination” – in name 
or in substance – has occurred.47 This brings the total to twenty-seven preliminary examinations, 
namely: Afghanistan; Bangladesh/Myanmar; Burundi; Central African Republic I (CAR I); Central 
African Republic II (CAR II); Colombia; Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia 
(Comoros); Côte d’Ivoire; Darfur, Sudan (Darfur); the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); 
Gabonese Republic (Gabon); Georgia; Guinea; Honduras; Iraq/UK; Kenya; Libya; Mali; Nigeria; 
Palestine I; Palestine II; Republic of Korea (South Korea); Republic of the Philippines (the 
Philippines); Uganda; Ukraine; Venezuela I; and Venezuela II.  
 The study is based on a review of information made publically available by the OTP, most 
notably the detailed reports on preliminary examination activities published from 2011 onwards.48 In 
 
47 The OTP did not use the term “preliminary examination” in its early practice. However, it referred in substance to this 
pre-investigative process. 
48 Starting in 2011 the OTP began publishing annual reports on its preliminary examination activities. Additionally, in 
relation to certain situations it released what it calls “Article 53(1) Reports” upon the conclusion of certain preliminary 
examinations. ICC-OTP, Situation in Mali: Article 53(1) Report, 16 January 2013, online: <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/itemsDocuments/SASMaliArticle53_1PublicReportENG16Jan2013.pdf> (accessed 16 August 2018) [Mali 
Article 53(1) Report]; ICC-OTP, Situation in the Central African Republic II: Article 53(1) Report, 24 September 2014, online: 
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/art_53_1_report_car_ii_24sep14.pdf> (accessed 16 August 2018) [CAR II 
Article 53(1) Report]; ICC-OTP, Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia: Article 53(1) Report, 6 
November 2014, online: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-com-article_53(1)-report-06nov2014eng.pdf> 
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earlier years, the Office did not routinely publish such information. Nonetheless, some information 
about earlier preliminary examinations can be found in the annual reports of the Court to the 
Assembly of States Parties (ASP), annual ICC reports to the UN General Assembly, and some public 
statements of the OTP. 
 After collating this information, we then classified all preliminary examinations according to 
relevant criteria. The first of these was the relevant geographic region(s), including the region(s) where 
the alleged crimes were committed (state of territorial jurisdiction) as well as the region(s) that the 
alleged perpetrators were from if known (state of nationality jurisdiction). For this purpose, we used 
the UN General Assembly regional categories.49    
The second criterion was the “trigger” for the preliminary examination using four categories: 
State Party referral; UN Security Council referral; a decision made by the Prosecutor proprio motu on 
the basis of an article 12(3) declaration; or a decision made by the Prosecutor proprio motu without an 
article 12(3) declaration. We distinguished between these two types of proprio motu situations because 
 
(accessed 16 August 2018) [Comoros Article 53(1) Report]. The OTP also published what it calls “Article 5 Reports” 
detailing its conclusion in relations to issues of subject-matter jurisdiction. ICC-OTP, Situation in Nigeria: Article 5 Report, 
5 August 2013, online: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/docs/SAS%20-%20NGA%20-
%20Public%20version%20Article%205%20Report%20-%2005%20August%202013.PDF> (accessed 16 August 2018) 
[Nigeria Article 5 Report]; ICC-OTP, Situation in the Republic of Korea: Article 5 Report, June 2014, online: 
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/sas-kor-article-5-public-report-eng-05jun2014.pdf> (accessed 16 August 2018) 
[South Korea Article 5 Report]; ICC-OTP, Situation in Honduras: Article 5 Report, October 2015, online: 
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/SAS-HON-Article_5_Report-Oct2015-ENG.PDF> (accessed 16 August 2018) 
[Honduras Article 5 Report]; ICC-OTP, Situation in the Gabonese Republic: Article 5 Report, 21 September 2018, online 
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/180921-otp-rep-gabon_ENG.pdf> (accessed 7 November 2018) [Gabon 
Article 5 Report]. Finally, the OTP published an “Interim Report” in relation to the situation in Colombia in November 
2012. ICC-OTP, Situation in Colombia: Interim Report, November 2012, online: <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/3d3055bd-16e2-4c83-ba85-
35bcfd2a7922/285102/otpcolombiapublicinterimreportnovember2012.pdf> (accessed 16 August 2018) [Colombia 
Interim Report]. As well, the OTP prepares detailed requests for authorization to proceed to an investigation for 
situations opened proprio motu if the Prosecutor determines that the article 53(1) criteria are fulfilled which contain 
considerable information about the preliminary examination that led to that decision. 
49 “United Nations Regional Groups of Member States”, Department for General Assembly and Conference Management Website, 
online: <http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml> (accessed 16 August 2018). Palestine is not 
included in any regional grouping at the UN as of yet but is listed as an Asia-Pacific state by the ICC’s ASP and was 
categorized as such. “Asia-Pacific States”, ICC Website, online: <https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/asian%20states/Pages/asian%20states.aspx> (accessed 16 August 2018). 
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the OTP has a policy of treating these situations differently,50 and because experience shows that the 
relevant state(s) are likely to react differently depending on whether or not they invited the ICC to 
intervene. Where there were two triggers for the same preliminary examination, we classified the 
situation according to the first one temporally51 because the second has no effect in terms of triggering 
a preliminary examination (but can have a subsequent legal effect, namely, if the second trigger is a 
referral from a State Party or the Security Council, the Prosecutor can proceed to an investigation 
without judicial authorization).  
The third criterion was the outcome of the preliminary examination, with the options being: 
decision not to proceed to investigation; decision to proceed to investigation; and decision pending. 
For situations in which the Prosecutor decided not to proceed to an investigation, we took note of the 
reasons, with the options being: preconditions to jurisdiction not met; subject-matter jurisdiction not 
met; inadmissible (complementarity); inadmissible (gravity); and investigation would not serve the 
interests of justice. These categories track closely with the criteria found in article 53(1) of the Rome 
Statute while allowing for a more specific analysis of the data. 
The fourth criterion was the preliminary examination’s duration, based on the best 
information that is publically available. For the starting date, we recorded the date that the preliminary 
 
50 See Grey and Wharton, supra note 5. 
51 This classification is done to the best of our ability based on the information made available by the OTP. In situations 
in which there is a state referral or article 12(3) declaration, we have taken this to be the initial trigger for the preliminary 
examination due to the Prosecutor’s policy of automatically opening a preliminary examination upon receipt of a referral 
or a declaration (as opposed to an article 15 communication) unless there is a clear statement that there was already a 
preliminary examination underway prior to the receipt of the referral or declaration. 
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examination was opened52 or, where that date is unknown, the date that it was announced53 or the date 
that the relevant Security Council referral,54 state referral,55 or article 12(3) declaration was received.56 
 
52 For example, the Government of Ukraine submitted its initial Article 12(3) declaration on 17 April 2014 and the OTP 
announced that it opened a preliminary examination into the situation in Ukraine just over a week later on 25 April 2014. 
Thus, a start date of 25 April 2014 was used. ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014, 2 December 
2014, online: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-pre-exam-2014.pdf> (accessed 16 August 2018) at paras 58-59 
[2014 PE Report]. Similarly, the OTP has stated that the situation in Gabon has been under preliminary examination 
since 29 September 2016, eight days after the receipt of the state referral. ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination 
Activities 2017, 4 December 2017, online: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2017-PE-rep/2017-otp-rep-
PE_ENG.pdf> (accessed 16 August 2018) at paras 23-4 [2017 PE Report]. The preliminary examination in Kenya was 
opened on 27 December 2007. ICC-OTP, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, “Request for authorisation of an investigation 
pursuant to Article 15”, 26 November 2009, ICC-01/09-3 at para. 3 [Kenya Request for Authorization]. The preliminary 
examination in Georgia was opened on 14 August 2008. ICC-OTP, Situation in Georgia, “Corrected Version of ‘Request 
for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15’, 16 October 2015, ICC-01/15-4-Corr”, 17 November 2015, 
ICC-01/15-4-Corr2 at para. 38 [Georgia Request for Authorization]. The situation in Guinea has been under preliminary 
examination since 14 October 2009; the Palestine II preliminary examination was opened on 16 January 2015; and the 
Burundi preliminary examination opened on 25 April 2016. 2017 PE Report, infra at paras 51, 156 & 282. The 
preliminary examination in the CAR II Situation was opened on 7 February 2014. CAR II Article 53(1) Report, supra 
note 48, at para. 4. Both the Venezuela II and the Philippines preliminary examinations were opened on 8 February 2018 
and the Bangladesh/Myanmar preliminary examination was opened on 18 September 2018. 2018 PE Report, supra note 
16 at paras 25, 42 & 99.  The Colombia preliminary examination has been opened “since June 2004,” thus we used the 
last day of the month for the purposes of any calculations. Colombia Interim Report, supra note 48, at para. 2. Finally, 
the OTP has stated that the preliminary examination in Afghanistan has been open “since 2006”. ICC, Situation in the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Public redacted version of ‘Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 
15’, 20 November 2017, ICC-02/17-2-Conf-Exp”, p-T. Ch. III, 20 November 2017, ICC-02/17-7-Red at para. 22. As 
no further information is available as to this preliminary examination’s starting date, we used the last day of 2006 for the 
purposes of our calculations. Thus, we can say that it lasted at least as long as this calculated amount.  
53 As the decision to open some of the earlier preliminary examinations were not initially made public, the “opening 
date” indicates that the preliminary examination was opened “at least as early as” a particular date at which point 
preliminary examination was made public. The preliminary examinations in Nigeria and Honduras were both announced 
on 18 November 2010. 2017 PE Report, supra note 52, at para. 204; “Honduras: Preliminary Examination”, ICC Website. 
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/honduras> (accessed 16 August 2018) [Honduras Preliminary Examination]. The preliminary 
examination in South Korea was announced on 6 December 2010. South Korea Article 5 Report, supra note 48, at para. 
2. 
54 UN Security Council Resolution 1593, S/RES/1593, 31 March 2005 (re Darfur); UN Security Council Resolution 
1790, S/RES/1790, 26 February 2011 (re Libya). 
55 Some state referrals were received subsequent to the opening of a preliminary examination. Thus, the referral date was 
only used as the date of the “opening” of the preliminary examination if it was the initial triggering mechanism for the 
preliminary examination. Situations for which the date of state referral was used include Uganda (referral date 16 
December 2003), CAR I (referral date 22 December 2004), Mali (referral date 18 July 2012), and Comoros (referral date 
14 May 2013). ICC, Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, “Decision on the confirmation of charges against Dominic Ongwen”, p-
T. Ch. III, 23 March 2016, ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red at para. 4; ICC-OTP, “BACKGROUND: Situation in the Central 
African Republic”, The Hague, 22 May 2007, ICC-OTP-BN-20070522-220-A_EN, online: <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B64950CF-8370-4438-AD7C-0905079D747A/144037/ICCOTPBN20070522220_A_EN.pdf> 
(accessed 16 August 2018) [CAR Background]; Mali Article 53(1) Report, supra note 48, at para. 2; Comoros Article 53(1) 
Report, supra note 48, at para. 7. 
56 The article 12(3) declaration from Côte d’Ivoire was received by the Prosecutor on 1 October 2003. ICC-OTP, 
Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, “Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15”, 23 June 2011, 
ICC-02/11-3 at para. 15 [Côte d’Ivoire Request for Authorization]. The attempted article 12(3) declaration from 
Palestine which triggered the Palestine I preliminary examination was submitted on 22 January 2009. ICC-OTP, Report on 
Preliminary Examination Activities 2012, November 2012, online: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C433C462-
7C4E-4358-8A72-8D99FD00E8CD/285209/OTP2012ReportonPreliminaryExaminations22Nov2012.pdf> (accessed 
16 August 2018) at para. 196 [2012 PE Report]. 
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Due to information gaps, some modifications to this method were necessary.  For example, for the 
preliminary examinations in Afghanistan and the DRC, the specific start date is unknown but there is 
some public information that allows us to approximate the start date.57 Moreover, for the first 
Venezuela preliminary examination, there is no available information on the start date. Hence, the 
approximate duration of the preliminary examination could not be calculated.58  There is similarly no 
available information on the initial start date of the Iraq/UK preliminary examination;59 all that it is 
known is the date on which this preliminary examination was “re-opened”.60  
 
57 Regarding Afghanistan, see note 52, above. Regarding the DRC, the OTP did not use the language of “preliminary 
examinations” this early in its practice. However, the OTP stated in a press release dated 16 July 2003 that it would 
“closely follow the situation” in the DRC, which indicates that a preliminary examination was in substance opened on 
that date. The OTP’s subsequent press release of 23 June 2004 further supports that inference.  ICC-OTP, Press 
Release, “Communications received by the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC” 16 July 2003, online: 
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B080A3DD-7C69-4BC9-AE25-
0D2C271A9A63/277502/16_july__english.pdf> (accessed 6 September 2018); ICC-OTP, Press Release, “Office of 
Prosecutor of International Criminal Court Opens First Investigation” 23 July 2004, online: 
<https://www.un.org/press/en/2004/l3071.doc.htm> (accessed 12 December 2018).  
58 The first public statement in relation to this preliminary examination was the announcement that it was closed. ICC-
OTP, “Letter to communication senders concerning the situation in Venezuela”, The Hague, 9 February 2006, online: 
<https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c90d25/pdf> (accessed 16 August 2018) [Venezuela Letter].  
59 ICC-OTP, “Letter to communication senders concerning the situation in Iraq”, The Hague, 9 February 2006, online: 
<http://www.iccnow.org/documents/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf> (accessed 16 August 
2018) [Iraq Letter].  
60 It is known that Prosecutor Bensouda re-opened the Iraq/UK preliminary examination on 13 May 2014, thus the 
most that can be said is that this preliminary examination has been ongoing at least as long as the duration since it has been 
re-opened. 2017 PE Report, supra note 52, at para. 172. 
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For the end date, we recorded the date that the Prosecutor either decided to: open an 
investigation61 or seek judicial authorization to do so,62 or to close the preliminary examination (where 
the Prosecutor decided that there was not a reasonable basis to proceed.)63 Finally, for those 
preliminary examinations that remain ongoing, the currency date of the 2018 Preliminary Examination 
Report (30 November 2018) was used to calculate the duration of these preliminary examinations thus 
far. 
Fifth, to the extent possible, we recorded the time spent by the OTP, during the preliminary 
examination, determining whether or not the Court had jurisdiction and whether or not potential cases 
would be admissible to the ICC. While the OTP says that it conducts its preliminary examinations 
holistically and, thus, will continue to gather and analyze all relevant information throughout the 
preliminary examination, its Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations indicates that the Office approaches 
the article 53(1) criteria of jurisdiction, admissibility, and “interests of justice” and sequentially.64  
 
61 ICC-OTP, Press Release, “Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens an Investigation into Northern 
Uganda”, 29 July 2004, ICC-OTP-20040729-65, online: <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=prosecutor+of+the+international+criminal+court+opens+an+investigation+into+noth
ern+uganda> (accessed 16 August 2018); CAR Background, supra note 55 (conclusion date 22 May 2007); ICC, Situation 
in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, “Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar 
Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi”, p-T. Ch. I, 27 June 2011, ICC-
01/11-01/11-1 at para. 2 (conclusion date 3 March 2011); ICC, Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Al Bashir, “Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Al Bashir”, p-T. Ch. I, 4 March 2009, ICC-
02/05-01/09-3 at para. 3 [First Al Bashir Arrest Warrant Decision] (OTP notified Pre-Trial Chamber of decision to 
proceed to investigation in situation in Darfur, Sudan on 1 June 2005); Mali Article 53(1) Report, supra note 48; CAR II 
Article 53(1) Report, supra note 48. For the preliminary examination in the DRC, we have considered the preliminary 
examination concluded at the point at which the Prosecutor informed the ASP that he was ready to request 
authorization to open an investigation. This was said to happen in September 2003. Thus, the last date of this month 
was used for the purposes of calculating the duration of the preliminary examination.  ICC, Assembly of States Parties, 
Third Session, “Report on the activities of the Court, 22 July 2004, ICC-ASP/3/10 at para. 55. 
62 In particular, the date on which the Prosecutor notified the President of the Court of his or her intention to submit a 
request for authorization to open an investigation proprio motu. Côte d’Ivoire Request for Authorization, supra note 56, at 
para. 8 (date of notification 19 May 2011); 2017 PE Report, supra note 52, at para. 231 (re Afghanistan – date of 
notification 30 October 2017) and para. 283 (re Burundi – date of notification 17 August 2017); Kenya Request for 
Authorization, supra note 52, at para. 1 (date of notification 5 November 2009); Georgia Request for Authorization, supra 
note 52, at para. 17 (date of notification 5 October 2015). 
63 Comoros Article 53(1) Report, supra note 48; Venezuela Letter, supra note 58; 2012 PE Report, supra note 56, at para. 
196 (re Palestine I, date of conclusion 3 April 2012); Honduras Preliminary Examination, supra note 53 (date of 
conclusion 28 October 2015); “Preliminary Examination: Republic of Korea”, ICC Website, online: <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/korea> (accessed 16 August 2018) (date of conclusion 23 June 2014); Gabon Article 5 Report, supra note 48. 
64 PE Policy Paper, supra note 33, at para. 77. 
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 To make the most of the available information, our study also considers correlations between 
different data series. For example, it considers correlations between the triggers for preliminary 
examinations and their duration, among others. As shown below, these correlations shed light on the 
OTP’s practice in opening, closing, and conducting preliminary examinations.  
 Finally, with respect to nomenclature, two points should be clarified. First, certain preliminary 
examinations relate to crimes allegedly committed in states that have already been the subject of a 
preliminary examination before. These include the Central African Republic (CAR), Palestine, and 
Venezuela, each of which lends its name to two distinct preliminary examinations concerning different 
alleged crimes. The OTP itself has adopted the sequential numbering of the “CAR I” and “CAR II” 
situations and we have followed this approach with respect to both Palestine I and II and Venezuela 
I and II for clarity.65 By contrast, we regard the preliminary examination regarding crimes allegedly 
committed by UK national in Iraq as one preliminary examination, noting that it was closed in 2006 
but then “re-opened” in 2014.66  
Second, the OTP’s practice of naming situations is inconsistent. In some cases, it labels 
situations according to the state on whose territory the alleged crimes occurred, notwithstanding the 
nationality of the alleged perpetrators;67 in other cases, it labels situations according to the state where 
some of the alleged crimes occurred;68 and in others it also references the state of the alleged 
perpetrators.69 While this naming practice is inconsistent, it is followed here for simplicity.  
 
65 Numbered sequentially according to their date of opening. 
66 ICC, “Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, re-opens the preliminary examination of the 
situation in Iraq”, 13 May 2014, online: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-iraq-13-05-
2014> (accessed 16 August 2018) [Prosecutor Re-Opens Preliminary Examination of the Situation in Iraq]. 
67 For example, “the situation in the Republic of Korea” concerned crimes allegedly committed in that state by nationals 
of North Korea. See South Korea Article 5 Report, supra note 48.  
68 For example, the “situation in Afghanistan” concerns crimes allegedly committed in that state and in CIA-operated 
facilities in Poland, Romania and Lithuania. ICC-OTP, Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Public redacted 
version of ‘Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15’, 20 November 2017, ICC-02/17-Conf-
Exp”, 20 November 2017, ICC-02/17-7-Red at para. 49 [Afghanistan Request for Authorization]. 




IV. FINDINGS: 15 YEARS OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS 
A. TRIGGERS FOR PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS  
Of the twenty-seven preliminary examinations analyzed, five (19%) were triggered by a state party 
referral,70 two (7%) were triggered by UN Security Council referral,71 four (15%) were triggered by the 
Prosecutor proprio motu following the receipt of an article 12(3) declaration,72 and sixteen (59%) were 
triggered by the Prosecutor proprio motu without an article 12(3) declaration.73 Given that the majority 
of preliminary examinations were opened proprio motu without an Article 12(3) declaration (and thus 
were likely opened on the basis of article 15 communications), this suggests that the Court is, to some 
degree, fulfilling its goal of being an international institution which is not wholly controlled by states, 
but one in which victims, individuals, and civil society organizations can have recourse to as well 
(although state actors can also submit article 15 communications, and have done so).74 
 
70 Uganda, CAR I, Mali, Comoros, and Gabon. 
71 Darfur, Sudan, and Libya. 
72 Côte d’Ivoire, Palestine I, Ukraine, and Palestine II.  
73 DRC, Colombia, Iraq/UK, Venezuela I, Kenya, Afghanistan, Georgia, Guinea, Republic of Korea, Nigeria, Honduras, 
CAR II, Burundi, the Philippines, Venezuela II, and Bangladesh/Myanmar.  





B. INFORMATION SEEKING AT THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION STAGE  
At the preliminary examination stage, the OTP has “limited powers at its disposal”.75 Notwithstanding 
that constraint, the OTP has considerable scope to gather information at this stage of proceedings. 
The Rome Statute says that, in order to analyse the seriousness of the information received at this 
stage, the Prosecutor “may seek additional information from States, organs of the United Nations, 
intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or other reliable sources that he or she deems 
appropriate,” and may also “receive written or oral testimony at the seat of the Court.”76 
 In practice, the OTP has made full use of these powers. Far from adopting a passive role at 
the preliminary examination stage, it undertakes numerous information-seeking activities including 
conducting missions to relevant states and hosting and participating in meetings at the seat of the 
Court and other locations during which it engages with relevant stakeholders including state officials, 
 
75 Iraq Letter, supra note 59, at 2; PE Policy Paper, supra note 33, at para. 85. 





Figure 1: Triggers for preliminary examinations 
(as at 30 November 2018) 
UN Security Council referral State party referral
Prosecutor with Art. 12(3) declaration Prosecutor without Art. 12(3) declaration
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victims and victim representative organizations, international and local NGOs. The OTP also reviews 
open source information. For example, in its 2018 preliminary examination report, the OTP stated 
that, in the reporting year, “the Office sent preliminary examination missions to Abuja, Bogota, 
Conakry, and Kyiv and held numerous consultations at the seat of the Court with State authorities, 
representatives of international and non-governmental organisations, article 15 communication 
senders and other interested parties.”77 
 When possible, the OTP conducts missions to the relevant states in the conduct of its 
preliminary examinations in order to verify information received about alleged crimes and to engage 
with local stakeholders and judicial actors. For example, since opening the Guinea preliminary 
examination in September 2009, the OTP has conducted sixteen missions to that country.78 Since 
announcing the Georgia preliminary examination in August 2008, it has conducted nine missions 
regarding that situation: six in Georgia, and three to Russia.79 In relation to the situation in Colombia, 
the OTP conducted three missions to that country in 2018 alone.80 During these and other preliminary 
examination missions, the OTP met with political and judicial authorities, as well as representatives of 
intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and victims.81 The Prosecutor has also met with numerous 
heads of states including the presidents of Palestine, Colombia, Guinea, and Nigeria, to discuss 
relevant preliminary examinations.82 However, the OTP has struggled to conduct missions to the 
relevant states on some occasions. It was not able to conduct its first mission to Afghanistan until 
 
77 2018 PE Report, supra note 16, at para. 23. 
78 2018 PE Report, supra note 16 at para. 180. 
79 Georgia Request for Authorization, supra note 52, at para. 39. 
80 2018 PE Report, supra note 16, at para. 161. 
81 2017 PE Report, supra note 52, at paras 48, 116, 169 & 233. ; ICC-ASP, “Report on the activities of the Court”, Ninth 
Session, ICC-ASP/9/23, 19 November 2010 at para. 62; 2012 PE Report, supra note 56, at paras 160 & 162; ICC-OTP, 
Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2013, November 2013, online: <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/OTP%20Reports/otp-report-2013.aspx> (accessed 17 August 2018) at para. 197 [2013 PE Report]; and 2014 PE 
Report, supra note 52, at para. 165.  
82 2012 PE Report, supra note 56, at paras 94 & 160; 2013 PE Report, supra note 81, at para. 150; Report of the International 
Criminal Court to the Seventy-first session of the UN General Assembly, UNGAOR, A/71/342, 19 August 2016 at para. 24. 
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2013, even though it had been conducting a preliminary examination in the situation since 2006.83 
Similarly, the OTP was unsuccessful for years in its attempts to conduct a mission to Côte d’Ivoire.84 
 The OTP has also used the preliminary examination process to promote “positive 
complementarity”, meaning that it seeks to encourage and support genuine domestic proceedings.85 
For example, the OTP met with the President of the Criminal Appellate Division of the Colombian 
Supreme Court, participated in a conference on “Strengthening the Attorney General’s office on 
Transitional Justice”, and met with the President of Colombia’s Constitutional Court amongst other 
liaison activities to support  such positive complementarity efforts.86 The Prosecutor even submitted 
an amicus curiae brief to the Constitutional Court of Colombia with respect to certain Colombian 
transitional justice legislation.87  
 In accordance with the Statute, the Office also requests relevant information at the preliminary 
examination stage. For example, in the context of its preliminary examination in Georgia, the OTP 
has made a total of fourteen formal requests for information, “six to the Government of Georgia, 
four to the Government of the Russian Federation, three to the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and one to the European Court of Human Rights”.88 The OTP meets 
with varying success with respect to these formal requests. In the context of its Afghanistan 
preliminary examination, the OTP submitted 29 formal requests but only received 15 responses.89 In 
its preliminary examination in the situation in South Korea, the OTP sought and received information 
 
83 Afghanistan Request for Authorization, supra note 68, at para. 26.  
84 ICC-ASP, Report on the activities of the Court, Sixth Session, 18 October 2007, ICC-ASP/6/18 at para. 37; ICC-ASP, 
Report on the activities of the Court, Seventh Session, 29 October 2008, ICC-ASP/7/25 at para. 68; ICC-ASP, Report on the 
activities of the Court, Eighth Session, 21 October 2009, ICC-ASP/8/40 at para. 60. 
85 PE Policy Paper, supra note 33, at paras 100-03. For a recent evaluation of the effectiveness of this “positive 
complementarity” approach, see: Human Rights Watch, “Pressure Point: The ICC’s Impact on National Justice Lessons 
from Colombia, Georgia, Guinea, and the United Kingdom” (May 2018), Human Rights Watch, online: 
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/ij0418_web_0.pdf> (accessed 7 September 2009). 
86 ICC-ASP, Report on the activities of the Court, Ninth Session, 19 November 2010, ICC-ASP/9/23, at para. 63; 2014 PE 
Report, supra note 52, at para. 128; 2017 PE Report, supra note 52, at para. 153. 
87 2017 PE Report, supra note 52, at para. 153. 
88 Georgia Request for Authorization, supra note 52, at para. 39. 
89 Afghanistan Request for Authorization, supra note 68, at para. 23. 
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from the Government of South Korea but received no response to its request to the Government of 
North Korea.90 In addition to formal requests for information, the OTP has solicited and received 
legal submissions to assist in its analysis of challenging legal questions that arise. For example, in its 
Palestine I preliminary examination, the OTP reported having considered “15 legal submissions from 
experts, academics and NGOs on the issue of jurisdiction.”91  
 Finally, if the OTP concludes that there is a reasonable basis to open an investigation, and 
there is no state or Security Council referral, its work at the preliminary examination stage includes the 
preparation of a detailed request to the pre-trial chamber for authorization to commence an 
investigation. The OTP’s most recent request, submitted upon completion of its preliminary 
examination in Afghanistan, totaled 181 pages of written submissions (plus numerous annexes).92  
As shown in this brief outline, preliminary examinations constitute a significant part of the 
OTP’s work. Far from waiting for information to arrive at its doors, the Office proactively seeks 
information from a wide range of sources, engages extensively with external actors, and expends 
considerable energy promoting “positive complementarity” as well.  
 
C. LEGAL FINDINGS ON ARTICLE 53(1) CRITERIA   
In terms of internal activities, the OTP’s main task during a preliminary examination is for the 
Prosecutor to determine whether or not the statutory criteria for opening a preliminary examination 
are made out. As stated above, these criteria are found in article 53(1) of the Rome Statute and relate 
to “jurisdiction”, “admissibility”, and the “interest of justice”.  
 
 
90 South Korea Article 5 Report, supra note 48, at para. 5. 
91 Report of the International Criminal Court to the Sixty-fifth session of the UN General Assembly, UNGAOR, A/65/313, 19 
August 2010, at para. 82 [Report of ICC to 65th Session of UNGA]. 
92 Afghanistan Request for Authorization, supra note 68. 
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1. Jurisdiction  
In determining whether or not there is a reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction have been committed, the Office must first consider whether certain preconditions to 
jurisdiction are satisfied. Specifically, with the exception of Security Council referrals, the alleged 
crimes must have been committed on the territory of a state that has accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction 
(either by ratifying the Rome Statute, or making a declaration under article 12(3)), or by a national of 
such a state.  
This issue proved contentious in the Palestine I preliminary examination, which was triggered 
in 2009 when the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) attempted to submit an article 12(3) 
declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC.93 The OTP also received 400 article 15 
communications relating to Palestine.94 However, without the consent of a relevant state or a Security 
Council referral, the Prosecutor had no legal basis to proceed on these communications. Thus, the 
ability of the Prosecutor to act in this situation depended on the validity of the article 12(3) declaration. 
Ultimately, the Prosecutor closed this preliminary examination on 3 April 2012 based on its conclusion 
that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the statehood of Palestine was not at that time confirmed 
by the UN General Assembly and, thus, the PNA did not have the capacity to lodge an article 12(3) 
declaration.95 This situation is noteworthy because on other occasions, including an attempted article 
12(3) declaration by the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt and proceedings relating to Myanmar and 
Bangladesh, the OTP has made its conclusion on whether the preconditions to jurisdiction are 
satisfied before a preliminary examination has formally begun.96 
 
93 2012 PE Report, supra note 56, at para. 196. 
94 Seventh Report of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations for 2010/2011, UNGOAR, A/66/309, 9 August 2011 
at para. 84. 
95 2012 PE Report, supra note 56, at paras 196 & 201. 
96 See Grey and Wharton, supra note 5. 
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If satisfied that the preconditions to jurisdiction are fulfilled, the OTP must next consider 
whether the alleged crimes fall within its temporal and subject-matter jurisdiction. The Prosecutor has 
closed four preliminary examinations on this basis. The first occasion was in 2006, when the (then) 
Prosecutor closed the Venezuela I preliminary examination. The OTP stated that it had received 12 
communications relating to this situation but that some communications related to crimes committed 
in the context of a failed coup in April 2002 and, thus, pre-dated the temporal jurisdiction of the 
Court.97 The other communications related to allegations of crimes committed by the government of 
Venezuela against its political opponents but were criticized as being “very generalized”, “not […] 
substantiated by analysis of open source information”, and rife with inconsistencies.98 Thus, the 
Prosecutor concluded that there was no reasonable basis to believe that crimes against humanity were 
committed.99 
 The next occasion was in June 2014 when Prosecutor Bensouda closed the South Korea 
preliminary examination that began in 2010, which concerned war crimes allegedly committed during 
the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan in the Yellow Sea and the shelling of South Korea’s 
Yeongpyeong Island by North Korea.100 While the OTP concluded that the chapeau requirement of an 
international armed conflict was established and that the Court could exercise jurisdiction on the basis 
of objective territoriality, it concluded that the specific elements of relevant war crimes were not made 
out.101  
The third example was in 2015 when the OTP closed the preliminary examination that it had 
been conducting in the situation in Honduras.102 This preliminary examination initially focused on 
 
97 Venezuela Letter, supra note 58. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
100 South Korea Article 5 Report, supra note 48, at para. 2. 
101 Ibid at paras 39 & 43-81. 
102 Honduras Article 5 Report, supra note 48. 
23 
 
alleged crimes against humanity in the aftermath of the June 2009 coup d’état. In November 2013, the 
Prosecutor reached an initial conclusion that there was no reasonable basis to believe that there was a 
widespread or systematic attack in the aftermath of the coup and, thus, the acts in question did not 
amount to crimes against humanity.103 Despite this, the OTP continued its preliminary examination in 
light of further allegations of crimes committed in the Bajo Aguán region of the country. Ultimately, 
in 2015 the OTP concluded that these alleged crimes may have been linked to the rise of drug 
trafficking in the country but, again, did not amount to crimes against humanity.104  
Most recently, the OTP closed its preliminary examination into the situation in Gabon on 21 
September 2018.105 Following the submission of a state referral by the Government of Gabon on 21 
September 2016, the OTP opened a preliminary examination in relation to post-election violence in 
the country eight days later (the OTP also reported having received eighteen article 15 
communications in relation to this situation).106 However, the Prosecutor ultimately concluded that 
the available information did not provide a reasonable basis to believe that allegations against both 
state security forces and opposition forces amounted to crimes against humanity nor did allegations 
against opposition leader amount to incitement to commit genocide.107 Accordingly, the Prosecutor 
closed the preliminary examination on the basis of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
As to ongoing assessments, the OTP is currently analyzing jurisdiction in the preliminary 
examinations in Ukraine, the Philippines, Venezuela II, and Bangladesh/Myanmar. The preliminary 
examination in Ukraine was opened on 25 April 2014 following the submission of an article 12(3) 
 
103 2013 PE Report, supra note 81, at at paras 71-73. 
104 ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities (2015), 12 November 2015, online: <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-pe-rep-2015-eng.pdf> (accessed 17 August 2018) at paras 276 & 278 [2015 PE Report]. 
105 Gabon Article 5 Report, supra note 48. 
106 Ibid at paras 3-9. 
107 Ibid at paras 16-20. See also 2018 PE Report, supra note 16 at paras 285-312. 
24 
 
declaration by the Government of Ukraine.108 That government then lodged a second article 12(3) 
declaration on 8 September 2015, extending the timeframe of the acceptance of jurisdiction.109 In 
addition, the OTP has received eighty-six article 15 communications in relation to this situation.110 
This preliminary examination focuses on allegations in three related contexts: the protests that erupted 
in Kyiv’s Maidan square in 2013; Crimea; and Eastern Ukraine.111 In 2015, the OTP concluded that 
there was a reasonable basis to believe that the suppression of the “Maidan protests” was an attack 
against a civilian population pursuant to a state policy, but that the attack was neither widespread nor 
systematic and, thus, no crimes against humanity were committed.112 The OTP has continued its 
assessment of subject-matter jurisdiction in the other contexts including the Russian seizure and 
annexation of Crimea and in relation to fighting between the Ukrainian government and anti-
government forces in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine, including the shooting down of 
Malaysian Airlines flight MH17.113 
 On 8 February 2018, Prosecutor Bensouda opened two new preliminary examinations proprio 
motu in the situations in the Philippines and Venezuela II.114 The Philippines preliminary examination 
focuses on alleged crimes perpetrated in the context of “the so-called ‘war on drugs’” including those 
“promoted and encouraged” by Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and other senior government 
 
108 Embassy of Ukraine to the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, “Letter transmitting Article 12(3) declaration”, 9 
April 2014, online: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/997/declarationRecognitionJurisdiction09-04-2014.pdf> 
(accessed 4 August 2018). See also 2014 PE Report, supra note 52, at para. 59. 
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officials.115 The Venezuela II preliminary examination relates to allegations of crimes against humanity 
perpetrated “in the context of demonstrations and related political unrest” in the country since early 
2017.116 Interestingly, the Venezuela II situation is the first for which a state referral was made (post 
hoc)117 from states other than the territorial state (i.e. the first non-self-referral). This referral was made 
jointly by six states from the Americas, namely the Argentine Republic, Canada, the Republic of 
Colombia, the Republic of Chile, the Republic of Paraguay, and the Republic of Peru, on 26 September 
2018.118  
 Finally, on 18 September 2018, Prosecutor Bensouda announced that she was opening a 
preliminary examination proprio motu in relation to the alleged deportation of Rohingya people from 
Myanmar to Bangladesh, and possible other crimes, after receiving thirty-four article 15 
communications relating to this situation.119 This announcement followed a decision issued by Pre-
Trial Chamber I, upon application from the OTP, which concluded that the Court could exercise 
jurisdiction over the alleged deportation of Rohingya people from Myanmar into Bangladesh, and 
possibly other crimes against humanity as well.120  The Chamber reasoned that, although Myanmar is 
not a state party to the Rome Statute, the Court had jurisdiction because the alleged deportation 
occurred in part in Bangladesh, which is a state party.121 
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2. Admissibility  
After considering jurisdiction, the OTP must determine whether or not potential future cases would 
be admissible to the ICC in accordance with article 17 of the Rome Statute. The first consideration 
here is the principle of “complementarity”, which limits admissible cases to those not investigated or 
prosecuted genuinely by the relevant domestic courts.122  While there are no actual “cases” at the 
preliminary examination phase, the Prosecutor must assess whether any potential cases would be 
admissible. To date, no preliminary examinations have been closed on the basis of inadmissibility due 
to complementarity. This is likely, at least in part, a result of the OTP’s commitment to “positive 
complementarity”, that is, its commitment to encouraging genuine national prosecutions of the alleged 
crimes. 
Additionally, a case is inadmissible before the ICC if it “is not of sufficient gravity to justify 
further action by the Court.”123 On February 2006, the OTP announced that it was closing a 
preliminary examination into the Iraq/UK situation on this basis.124 While Iraq is not a state party to 
the Rome Statute, the allegations related to crimes allegedly committed by nationals of the UK, which 
is a state party, giving the ICC jurisdiction under article 12(2)(b) of the Rome Statute. The preliminary 
examination was opened on the basis of “over 240” article 15 communications.125 The OTP concluded 
that, within its limited jurisdiction over what allegedly happened in Iraq, there was a reasonable basis 
to believe that the war crimes of wilful killing of approximately four to twelve victims and inhumane 
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treatment of less than twenty victims had been perpetrated.126 Nonetheless, it ultimately concluded 
that this did not meet the required gravity threshold and, thus, was not admissible.127 Accordingly, the 
OTP closed the preliminary examination with a decision not to proceed to an investigation. However, 
on 13 May 2014, Prosecutor Bensouda “re-opened” this preliminary examination on the basis of new 
information relating to the allegations.128 
 The Comoros preliminary examination was the second to be closed due to a conclusion of 
insufficient gravity, and the only preliminary examination to remain closed on that basis. The 
preliminary examination was initiated as a result of a state party referral by Comoros concerning the 
2010 interception of a humanitarian aid flotilla destined for Gaza by the Israeli Defence Forces on 
ships registered to Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, which resulted in the death of ten people on the 
vessel registered to Comoros (the Mavi Marmara) and the mistreatment of other passengers.129 The 
OTP concluded that there was a reasonable basis to believe that war crimes were committed on the 
Mavi Marmara, however “the total number of victims of the flotilla incident reached relatively limited 
proportions as compared, generally, to other cases involved by the Office.”130 Accordingly, the 
preliminary examination was closed due to insufficient gravity. Comoros asked the Pre-Trial Chamber 
to review the Prosecutor’s decision and to request that she re-consider.131 The Pre-Trial Chamber 
granted that request.132 This was the first and, thus far, the only time that such a request to the 
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Prosecutor has been made. On 29 November 2017, the Prosecutor released a “final decision” 
affirming her prior conclusion on the gravity threshold.133 A year later, a differently constituted Pre-
Trial Chamber released yet another decision reiterating the request to the Prosecutor to reconsider her 
decision (the majority concluding that the Prosecutor did not adequately comply with the earlier Pre-
Trial decision in her purported “final decision”).134 The Prosecutor has sought leave to appeal that 
decision.135 Thus, proceedings in relation to the Comoros situation linger on, more than four years 
after the Prosecutor’s initial decision to close the preliminary examination. 
As to other ongoing preliminary examinations, the OTP is still assessing admissibility in five 
situations: Colombia, Guinea, Nigeria, the re-opened Iraq/UK preliminary examination, and Palestine 
II. The preliminary examination in Colombia was opened in June 2004 (although it was not made 
public until later).136 It focuses on crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed by 
government forces as well as members of non-state armed groups including the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP), Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), and 
other paramilitaries.137 While the OTP has not clarified precisely when it concluded that there was a 
reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court had been committed in this 
situation, its reports show that this decision was made no later than 2010 at which point the OTP was 
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already focused on admissibility.138 Over the past few years, Colombia has sent the OTP hundreds of 
judgments that may relate to crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction.139 Nonetheless, the OTP has kept 
open the preliminary examination, with no final decision on whether the potential ICC cases are 
already the subject of genuine national proceedings.140 
 On 14 October 2009, the OTP opened a preliminary examination in the situation in Guinea, 
focusing on the violent suppression of pro-democracy/anti-government protests by security forces in 
Conakry stadium on 28 September 2009.141 By 13 December 2011, the OTP had concluded that there 
was a reasonable basis to conclude that crimes against humanity had been committed in this 
situation.142 Since then, the OTP has been focused on its admissibility assessment. Despite the fact 
that Guinean authorities expressed a commitment to investigating and prosecuting these crimes for 
years and have taken significant investigatory steps towards such prosecutions,143 the OTP has kept 
its preliminary examination ongoing, noting in its 2018 report that the national investigation in Guinea 
has been completed and proceedings into the relevant case are underway. Therefore, the OTP’s 
admissibility assessment has focused on whether the national authorities are willing and able to 
conduct those proceedings genuinely, “in particular whether proceedings are conducted with the 
intent to bring to justice the alleged perpetrators within a reasonable time frame.”144 
 The preliminary examination in Nigeria was opened proprio motu by Prosecutor Moreno-
Ocampo. It was made public on 18 November 2010145 but the OTP had been receiving article 15 
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communications over the preceding five years.146 This preliminary examination has considered 
numerous allegations in relation to three different regions and contexts within the country, including: 
“inter-communal, political and sectarian violence” in the Middle-Belt states; allegations of violence in 
the Niger Delta region; and alleged crimes committed by Boko Haram in the country’s north-east.147 
In its report of 5 August 2013, the OTP concluded that there was no reasonable basis to believe that 
the alleged crimes committed in the “inter-communal violence” and in the Niger Delta qualified as 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, but that there was a reasonable basis to conclude that 
crimes against humanity were committed by Boko Haram.148 While the OTP continues to look into 
reports of new crimes in Nigeria,149  for the past five years it has focused primarily on the issue of 
admissibility, noting that although “there seems to be a tangible prospect of further proceedings 
against members of Boko Haram, including high-level commanders, at this stage the same cannot be 
said of the [National Security Forces].”150 
 In relation to the Iraq/UK preliminary examination, Prosecutor Bensouda “re-opened” this 
preliminary examination on 13 May 2014 on the basis of new article 15 communications.151 The OTP 
has since concluded that there was a reasonable basis to believe that members of the UK forces 
committed war crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court against at least 61 victims,152 and is now 
focusing on the issue of admissibility.153 
 
However, the OTP also stated at this time that “the Office is still at the beginning of its preliminary examination work, 
in the process of determining whether or not Rome Statute crimes have been committed or not.” Thus, it remains 
unclear how far in advance of this 2010 announcement the OTP was engaged in an active preliminary examination. ICC-
OTP, “OTP Weekly Briefing”, 16-22 November 2010, Issue #64, online: <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP_Weekly_Briefing_64-ENG.pdf> (accessed 11 August 2018) at 2. 
146 Nigeria Article 5 Report, supra note 48, at para. 4. 
147 Ibid at paras 6-9 & 26-32. 
148 Ibid at paras 13-17, 40-62 & 77-126. 
149 2018 PE Report, supra note 16, at paras 227-232. 
150 Ibid at para. 249 
151 Ibid at paras 173-74. 
152 2018 PE Report, supra note 16, at paras 194-196. 
153  Ibid at paras 199-209. 
31 
 
Subsequent to the failed attempt by Palestine to submit an Article 12(3) declaration in 2009, 
the UN General Assembly granted Palestine “non-member observer state” status in late 2012.154 This 
allowed Palestine to submit a valid article 12(3) declaration on 1 January 2015, prompting the OTP to 
open a preliminary examination on 16 January of that year. The day after the deposit of its article 12(3) 
declaration, Palestine deposited its instrument of accession to the Rome Statute making it a state party. 
In addition to Palestine’s declaration, the OTP has received 125 communications in relation to alleged 
crimes committed in this context.155 As part of this preliminary examination, the OTP has stated that 
it is looking into crimes allegedly committed in relation to settlement activities in the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem and by both Palestinian armed groups as well as Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) during 
the conflict in Gaza in July-August 2014 and more recent violence along the Israel-Gaza border.156 
The OTP has noted challenges that have arisen in the context of this preliminary examination, 
including certain (unspecified) “novel and/or complex legal issues” involved.157 In May 2018, Palestine 
submitted a post hoc state self-referral of the situation to the Court, thereby enabling the Prosecutor to 
open an investigation without judicial authorization should she be satisfied that the statutory criteria 
are satisfied.158 The OTP’s 2018 report on preliminary examination activities indicates that it is 
continuing to assess subject matter jurisdiction in this situation, and is also considering the 
admissibility of potential cases in line with a “holistic” (as opposed to sequenced) assessment of the 
Article 53(1) criteria.159 The report states that the Office has reached an “advanced stage” of its 
assessment of those criteria in relation to Palestine160 and “intends to complete the preliminary 
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examination as early as possible”.161 However, it is silent as to whether the Prosecutor has determined 
that there is, or is not, a reasonable basis to believe that any crimes were committed, which is different 
to the other ongoing preliminary examinations where the OTP has proceeded to consider issues of 
admissibility.  
On the issue of complementarity, the OTP noted that there is no evidence of national 
investigations or prosecutions in relation to settlement activity or other crimes in the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem but that there have been investigative activities in relation to alleged crimes perpetrated 
by the IDF in relation to the 2014 Gaza conflict. By contrast, it suggests that there are no ongoing 
national proceedings, in either Palestine or Israel, in relation to crimes allegedly committed by 
Palestinian armed groups.162 
 
3. Interests of Justice  
The final requirement of article 53(1) states that the Prosecutor should proceed to an investigation 
unless: “[t]aking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless 
substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.” To date 
the Prosecutor has never closed a preliminary examination on the basis of this “interests of justice” 
criteria. Furthermore, the OTP’s analyses of this criteria tend to be very brief because article 53(1)(c) 
is framed in the negative, rather than something that the Prosecutor must establish. In September 
2007, the OTP issued a Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice which emphasizes the exceptional nature of 
a decision by the Prosecutor not to proceed on this basis and that “there is a presumption in favour 
of investigation” when the criteria of jurisdiction and admissibility are satisfied.163 While the policy 
paper provides little guidance on what would satisfy this test, it distinguishes between the “interests of 
 
161 Ibid, at para. 284. 
162 Ibid at paras 277-279. 
163 Supra note 39, at 1 & 3. 
33 
 
justice” and the “interests of peace”, stating that the latter falls outside the purview of the OTP.164 In 
the intervening eleven years, the OTP has not reviewed this policy. 
 In most situations in which the OTP has concluded a preliminary examination with a decision 
to proceed to an investigation, very little is said about this criterion short of a brief sentence or two 
stating that there are “no reasons to believe that the opening of an investigation into the situation 
would not be in the interests of justice.”165 On some occasions, the OTP has pointed to support from 
victims and victim organisations for prosecutions to substantiate its conclusion to proceed.166 For 
example, in its preliminary examination in the situation in CAR I, the OTP noted, in particular, a 
recent mission to Bangui “where the OTP received clear confirmation that many of the victims in the 
Central African Republic were awaiting the involvement of the ICC in order to see justice done and 
to recover their dignity.”167 In its request for authorization of an investigation in the situation in 
Afghanistan, the OTP pointed to a nationwide consultation conducted by Afghanistan’s Independent 
Human Rights Commission which “found that the desire for criminal justice was strong”, as well as 
to a joint letter to the Prosecutor submitted by fifteen civil society organisations and an open letter 
published by 28 Afghan NGOs which both called on the ICC for action.168 Similarly, in concluding 
its preliminary examination in Georgia, the OTP pointed to submissions made by victims and human 
rights organizations indicating the victims’ desire to see justice done, as well as the calls for an ICC 
investigation by the Office of the Public Defender/Ombudsman of Georgia.169 The OTP also noted 
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that it considered “views expressed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which 
has recurrently called for independent investigations”.170 
 
D. OUTCOMES OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS   
Once the OTP has concluded that all of the article 53(1) criteria are satisfied, the Rome Statute 
mandates that the Prosecutor shall open an investigation. If there was no referral by a state party or 
the Security Council, the Prosecutor must first obtain authorization from a Pre-Trial Chamber before 
the investigation can proceed.171 As of the 2018 report on preliminary examinations, twenty-seven 
preliminary examinations had been opened, twelve of which concluded with a decision to proceed to 
an investigation (seven under the leadership of Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo172 and the remaining five 
during Prosecutor Bensouda’s term).173 Of the remaining preliminary examinations, seven were closed 
with a decision not to proceed to an investigation (although the Iraq/UK preliminary examination 
was subsequently “re-opened”)174 and nine (including Iraq/UK) remain ongoing. 175 
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1. Preliminary Examinations Leading to an Investigation  
The most common outcome for preliminary examinations has been to progress to an investigation. 
The first example was in June 2004, when Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo opened an investigation in 
the DRC after receiving a ‘self-referral’ from that state in April 2004.176 Interestingly, although that 
investigation was triggered by a referral, the preliminary examination was opened by the Prosecutor on 
his own motion (in September 2003, the Prosecutor announced that he was ready to request 
authorization to open an investigation in the DRC,177 indicating that he had already conducted a 
preliminary examination proprio moto and determined that there was a reasonable basis to proceed). 
One month later, the Prosecutor opened a second investigation in the situation in Uganda.178 This 
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development followed the decision by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni to refer “the situation 
concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army” – a rebel group which had been working to overthrow his 
government since the 1990s – to the ICC Prosecutor in December 2003.179 Because the OTP did not 
announce the opening of preliminary examinations at this early stage in its practice, there is some 
uncertainty as to whether or not the Prosecutor was already conducting a preliminary examination 
into the Ugandan situation prior to Museveni’s referral.180   
For both the DRC and Uganda situation, there is limited information about the steps taken 
by the OTP during these early preliminary examinations. However, as time went on, the OTP’s 
practice of opening preliminary examinations and investigations became increasingly transparent. On 
22 May 2007, the OTP announced the start of a third investigation, this time into crimes allegedly 
committed in the CAR.181 This investigation followed a preliminary examination that began when the 
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OTP received a self-referral from that state in December 2004182 and which took into account several 
communications from NGOs and international organizations,183 some of which were submitted 
before the referral was received.184 
 The next major development was in March 2005, when the UN Security Council referred the 
situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC.185 Two months later,186 Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo 
announced his decision to open an investigation into that situation. The Court’s second UN Security 
Council referral came on 26 February 2011, in relation to the situation in Libya. Prosecutor Moreno-
Ocampo announced the opening of the OTP’s investigation into the situation a mere 5 days later, 
making this the shortest preliminary examination to date.187 
 After that flurry of referrals, the Prosecutor began to open investigations proprio motu. The first 
example concerned Kenya’s 2007-2008 post-election violence. In line with the former Prosecutor’s 
practice a of seeking referrals from states, the OTP held several discussions with Kenyan authorities 
about a possible state referral after beginning a preliminary examination in December 2007.188 
However, no such referral eventuated and, in November 2009, the Prosecutor requested judicial 
authorization to open an investigation, and received that authorization in March 2010.189 In June 2011, 
the Prosecutor requested authorization to open another investigation proprio motu, this time in relation 
to the 2010-2011 post-election violence in Côte d’Ivoire. Côte d’Ivoire was at that time not a state 
party to the Rome Statute. However, it had accepted the jurisdiction of the Court through an article 
 
182  Regarding the initiation of the CAR I preliminary examination, see CAR Background, supra note 55, at 1. 
183 Ibid. 
184 ICC-OTP, Situation in the Central African Republic, “Prosecution’s Report Pursuant to Pre-Trial Chamber III’s 30 
November 2006 Decision Requesting Information on the Status of the Preliminary Examination in the Situation in the 
Central African Republic”, 15 December 2006, ICC-01/05-7, at para. 13. 
185 First Al Bashir Arrest Warrant Decision, supra note 61, at para. 1. 
186 On 1 June 2005. Ibid at para. 3. 
187 ICC, Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, “Decision on the ‘Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to 
Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi”, p-T. Ch. I, 27 June 2011, 
ICC-01/11-01/11-1, at para. 2. 
188 Ibid at para. 14. 
189 Ibid; ICC, Situation in Kenya, “Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an 
Investigation into the Situation in Kenya”, p-T. Ch. II, 31 March 2010, ICC-01/09-19. 
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12(3) declaration in 2003190 and later confirmed acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction on two further 
occasions.191 The pre-trial judges authorized the investigation on October 2011192 and, in February 
2013, Côte d’Ivoire ratified the Rome Statute.  
  The ICC’s next investigation, and the first opened by Prosecutor Bensouda, related to crimes 
allegedly committed in Mali. That investigation was opened in January 2013, after Bensouda received 
Mali’s “self-referral” in July 2012 which triggered the preliminary examination.193 By November 2012, 
the OTP had already determined that there was a reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court had been committed, and the investigation was opened shortly thereafter.194  
 An earlier situation in the CAR had already been the subject of an investigation by the OTP 
when Prosecutor Bensouda opened an investigation in relation to a subsequent conflict in that state 
in September 2014 (CAR II).195 While the Prosecutor opened the CAR II preliminary examination 
proprio motu in February 2014,196 the CAR subsequently referred the situation to the Court on May 
2014, removing the need to seek judicial authorization before the investigation could proceed.197  
 The investigation into the situation in Georgia, concerning the armed conflict in and around 
South Ossetia in 2008, was the next to be opened. This investigation was the first investigation opened 
 
190 The OTP received the declaration on 1 October 2003, triggering the preliminary examination. Côte d’Ivoire Request 
for Authorization, supra note 56, at para. 15. 
191 2011 PE Report, supra note 141, at para. 120. 
192 Côte d’Ivoire Request for Authorization, supra note 56; ICC, Situation in Côte d’Ivoire, “Decision Pursuant to Article 15 
of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire”, p-T. 
Ch. III, 3 October 2011, ICC-02/11-14. 
193 ICC, “Renvoi de la situation au Mali”, 13 July 2012, The Hague, online: <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A245A47F-BFD1-45B6-891C-3BCB5B173F57/0/ReferralLetterMali130712.pdf> (accessed 19 
October 2018); Mali Article 53(1) Report, supra note 48, at paras 5, 15 & 23-41. 
194 2012 PE Report, supra note 56, at, paras 142-170.195 ICC-OTP, “Statement of the International Criminal Court, Fatou 
Bensouda, on opening a second investigation in the Central African Republic”, 24 September 2014, ICC-OTP-
20140924-PR1043, online: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=pr1043> (accessed 9 September 2018). 
195 ICC-OTP, “Statement of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on opening a second investigation in the 
Central African Republic”, 24 September 2014, ICC-OTP-20140924-PR1043, online: <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=pr1043> (accessed 9 September 2018). 
196 ICC-OTP, Press Release, “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on 
opening a new Preliminary Examination in Central African Republic”, 7 August 2014, online: <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-07-02-2014> (accessed 24 August 2018); CAR II Article 53(1) Report, 
supra note 48, Executive Summary, para. 4. 
197 CAR II Article 53(1) Report, supra note 48, at para. 5. 
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in relation to a country outside of Africa, and the first investigation opened by Prosecutor Bensouda 
proprio motu. The preliminary examination was also notable, because unlike prior examples, it was 
initiated with the support of a major non-state party, Russia. In fact, the vast majority of article 15 
communications that triggered the preliminary examination (a total of 3,817) were sent by the 
Prosecutor General of Moscow.198 The OTP commenced the preliminary examination on 14 August 
2008 and, by 2011, concluded that there was a reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court were committed.199 On 17 March 2015, the Government of Georgia informed 
the OTP that national proceedings had been indefinitely suspended which prompted the OTP to 
conclude that “the potential cases identified in the Request would be admissible, due to State 
inaction.”200 The OTP requested authorization to open an investigation into the Situation in Georgia 
on 13 October 2015, which was granted by Pre-Trial Chamber I on 27 January 2016.201 
 The commencement of the next investigation, in relation to the situation in Burundi, occurred 
in tense circumstances. On 25 April 2016, Prosecutor Bensouda announced that the OTP was opening 
a preliminary examination into crimes reportedly committed in Burundi since April 2015.202 In 
response to that announcement, Burundi submitted its notification of its intent to withdraw from the 
Rome Statute to the UN Secretary-General.203 Pursuant to article 127 of the Rome Statute, Burundi’s 
withdrawal became effective one year later, making it the first state to officially withdraw from the 
Court. In the context of that impending deadline, the preliminary examination proceeded quicker than 
most. Despite not having reached a conclusion with respect to either questions of jurisdiction or 
 
198 Report of the International Criminal Court to the Sixty-fourth session of the UN General Assembly, UNGOAR, A/64/356, 17 
September 2009, at para. 48. 
199 Georgia Request for Authorization, supra note 52, at paras 38-43. 
200 2015 PE Report, supra note 104, at paras 227 & 255. 
201 Georgia Request for Authorization, supra note 52; ICC, Situation in Georgia, “Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for 
authorisation of an investigation”, p-T. Ch. I, 27 January 2016, ICC-01/15-12. 
202 ICC-OTP, “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on opening a 
Preliminary Examination into the Situation in Burundi”, 25 April 2016, online: <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-25-04-2016> (accessed 18 August 2018). 
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admissibility as of its 2016 preliminary examination report,204 by 17 August 2017 the Prosecutor had 
concluded her preliminary examination and notified the ICC President of her intent to submit a 
request for authorization, which was submitted on 6 September 2017.205 The Pre-Trial Chamber also 
moved quickly, granting authorization to open an investigation on 25 October 2017.206 The Prosecutor 
opened her investigation that same day, a mere two days before Burundi’s withdrawal came into effect. 
 The most recent preliminary examination to conclude with a request for authorization to open 
an investigation is in the situation in Afghanistan. The OTP has stated that it has received article 15 
communications in relation to Afghanistan since 1 June 2006.207 The Afghanistan preliminary 
examination, which relates to the conflict in and associated with that country following the 9/11 
attacks,208 is one of the longest known preliminary examinations to date, second only to Colombia (see 
Figure 5, below).209 By 2013, the OTP concluded that there was a reasonable basis to believe that 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court had been committed.210 However, it was not until 30 
October 2017 that the Prosecutor notified the ICC President of her intent to submit a request for 
authorization of an investigation, which was submitted on 20 November 2017.211 In addition to 
numerous allegations against Taliban forces and “affiliated armed groups”, as well as against Afghan 
National Security Forces, the OTP concluded that there is a reasonable basis to believe that members 
 
204 2016 PE Report, supra note 113, at para. 59 (current to 30 September 2016). 
205 2017 PE Report, supra note 52, at para. 283; Burundi Request for Authorization, supra note 166. 
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of the US armed forces and the CIA perpetrated crimes,212 making the situation in Afghanistan 
politically challenging given the US’s current posture towards the ICC.  
 
2. Preliminary Examinations Closed Without an Investigation 
As of 30 November 2018, seven preliminary examinations were closed with a decision not to proceed 
to an investigation The reasons for this outcome vary: As detailed above, one was closed because the 
OTP concluded that the preconditions to jurisdiction were not satisfied (Palestine I); four were closed 
because the OTP concluded that there were not reasonable grounds to believe that crimes within the 
ICC’s jurisdiction had been committed (Venezuela I, South Korea, Honduras, and Gabon); and two 
were closed because the OTP concluded that the potential cases would be inadmissible due to 
insufficient gravity (Iraq/UK and Comoros).  
In 2014, Prosecutor Bensouda “re-opened” the Iraq/UK preliminary examination – which the 
previous Prosecutor had closed for lack of gravity - on the basis of new information.213 Additionally, 
in relation to Comoros, Pre-Trial Chamber I for the first time ever requested the Prosecutor to “re-
consider” her conclusion that the alleged crimes did not meet the gravity threshold for the ICC.214 
While the Prosecutor affirmed her initial conclusion, judicial proceedings in relation to this situation 
remain ongoing.215 These two events suggest that conclusions based on gravity may be more 
susceptible to challenge, critique, or reconsideration given that the gravity threshold is highly 
discretionary and there is still a fair amount of debate about how it should be applied. 
 To date, no preliminary examinations have been closed due to the existence of genuine 
national proceedings (complementarity). However, when the OTP initially closed the Iraq/UK 
 
212 Afghanistan Request for Authorization, supra note 68, at paras 187-252 & 352-363. For a discussion of other 
international forces, see paras 253-260. 
213 Prosecutor Re-Opens Preliminary Examination of the Situation in Iraq, supra note 66. 
214 Comoros Decision to Review, supra note 131. 
215 See Part C(2), above.  
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preliminary examination in 2006 on the basis of insufficient gravity, it also stated that “the Office also 
collected information on national proceedings […] and that national proceedings have been initiated 
with respect to each of the relevant incidents.”216 Recently, the OTP has reiterated that “the UK has 
initiated a number of criminal proceedings in relation to the conduct of UK troops in Iraq”.217 
Additionally, the OTP has been conducting some lengthy complementarity assessments, most notably 
in the situation in Colombia, as well as the Guinea and Nigeria preliminary examinations. Thus, one 
of these situations may become the first preliminary examination closed by reason of inadmissibility 
based on complementarity. Finally, the OTP has never concluded that it is not in the interests of 
justice to proceed to an investigation.  
 
Figure 3: Reasons not to proceed past a preliminary examination (as at 30 November 2018)  













Venezuela I  ✓    
Iraq/UK I    ✓  
South Korea  ✓    
Palestine I ✓     
Honduras  ✓    
Comoros     ✓  
Gabon  ✓    
 
E. FREQUENCY AND DURATION 
The frequency with which preliminary examinations are opened has been fairly consistent, with one 
to three preliminary examinations opened or announced almost every year since the appointment of 
the Court’s first prosecutor in June 2003. 
 
 
216 Iraq Letter, supra note 59. 




Not shown: Iraq/UK or Venezuela I (preliminary examinations closed in February 2006, but starting year unknown) 
* Nigeria and Honduras preliminary examinations made public in 2010, but actual starting year unknown. 
** Excludes Iraq/UK, which was ‘reopened’ in May 2014. 
 
While there was a slight surge in the opening of preliminary examinations in the Court’s early years, 
the frequency of new preliminary examinations has remained relatively consistent since then. It is 
noteworthy that there has been at least one new preliminary examination opened every year since the 
first Prosecutor took office, until 2017. However, 2017 was still a busy year for the OTP in relation to 
its preliminary examination activities, with the speedy conclusion of the Burundi preliminary 
examination, the request to open an investigation into Afghanistan being submitted, and the OTP’s 
“final decision” on the Comoros preliminary examination being rendered. Furthermore, the fact that 
three new preliminary examinations have already been opened in 2018 demonstrates the continuing 
regularity of new preliminary examinations for the OTP. This consistency is interesting because it 
suggests that both state and non-state actors continue to turn to the ICC to seek justice for atrocities 
despite the criticisms that the Court has faced. 
With respect to the duration of preliminary examinations, the OTP has stated that there are 
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Figure 4: Number of preliminary examinations opened per year
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timetables “would not be workable”.218 As multiple commentators have observed, the fact that the 
Prosecutor is under no time limitations to conduct preliminary examinations is legally correct.219 
Reasons given by the Prosecutor for the absence of time limits include the need to monitor certain 
situations over time as they continue to develop, the potentially lengthy period of time needed to 
monitor national proceedings before making a decision on admissibility, and the prioritization 
necessarily resulting from the limited resources of the OTP.220 
 Despite the Prosecutor’s stated objective “to complete all analyses as expeditiously as possible 
in order to reach timely decisions whether to investigate”,221 the OTP has been criticized for the 
relatively slow pace of some preliminary examinations.222 The sheer length of certain preliminary 
examinations has been criticized for keeping the potential accused, victims, and affected communities 
in “potential purgatory”.223 Affected parties have raised similar concerns. For example, the legal team 
who submitted the referral on behalf of the state of Comoros sent multiple letters to the Prosecutor 
expressing concern about the length of time it was taking to make a decision about whether or not to 
proceed to an investigation.224 Similar concerns were expressed by the government of CAR after it 
submitted its first state referral to the Court.225 Chambers of the Court have also stressed the need for 
timeliness in the conduct of preliminary examinations.226 For example, in a recent decision relating to 
 
218 Annex to 2003 Policy Paper, supra note17, at 3-4. The OTP has reiterated this on numerous occasions. E.g. 2017 PE 
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225 CAR Decision Requesting Information, supra note 219, at 2-3. See also Pavel Caban, “Preliminary Examinations by 
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45 
 
the Bangladesh/Myanmar situation, Pre-Trial Chamber I stated that “[e]xtended preliminary 
examinations affect the rights of victims and maintain them in a state of uncertainty which is 
prejudicial.”227 
 The disparity in length among preliminary examinations has also been criticized for “feed[ing] 
into the perceptions of bias with which the Court is struggling.”228 Finally, it has also been suggested 
that allowing preliminary examinations to go on for so long may work against the Court’s deterrent 
efforts by “desensitizing actors”.229 
 In response to such criticisms, many have suggested the imposition of timelines for 
preliminary examinations and increased judicial review of prosecutorial activities if the office fails to 
proceed within such timelines.230 While some of the strict timelines suggested by these authors may 
be untenable for the OTP, the unduly lengthy nature of some preliminary examinations, as well as the 
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Black bars represent preliminary examinations that concluded with an investigation; white bars represent preliminary 
examinations that closed without an investigation; striped bars represent ongoing preliminary examinations.  
 
* Afghanistan preliminary examination has been open “since 2006” but specific start date unknown (thus, the 
last date of that year used for purposes of calculation). 
** Nigeria and Honduras preliminary examinations made public on 18 November 2010 but actual start dates 
unknown. 
*** No initial start date for Iraq/UK preliminary examination is available. Start date for calculation above is the 
date on which the preliminary examination was “re-opened”. 

































Figure 5: Duration of prelimiminary examination in days 
(as at 30 November 2018)
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Figure 5 shows the duration of preliminary examinations based upon the best publically available 
information.231 As is immediately apparent, the length of different preliminary examinations varies 
drastically. The preliminary examination in Libya lasted only five days before the OTP decided to 
proceed to an investigation, whereas the preliminary examination in Colombia has been ongoing for 
more than fourteen years. The longest concluded preliminary examination involves the situation in 
Afghanistan which lasted well over ten years at least.  
 The OTP has demonstrated that preliminary examinations can be completed in a timely 
fashion, with half a dozen being completed in less than a year and a total of ten preliminary 
examinations completed in less than two years. On the other hand, another half a dozen preliminary 
examinations have lasted more than seven years, including the situations in Nigeria, Georgia, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Guinea, Afghanistan, and Colombia, with three of these still ongoing. Eighteen preliminary 
examinations have been completed to date with an average length of just over 1041 days (2.85 years).232 
 It has been suggested that preliminary examinations that entail very involved complementarity 
assessments will be lengthier as the OTP engages with the state to evaluate the status of domestic 
proceedings.233 Examples include the ongoing preliminary examinations in Nigeria, Guinea, and 
Colombia, which have been at the admissibility phase for approximately five years, seven years, and 
eight years respectively thus far. On the other hand, there have been lengthy preliminary examinations 
where the bulk of time was spent determining whether or not there is a reasonable basis to believe 
that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction. For example, the preliminary examination in Côte 
d’Ivoire was opened on 1 October 2003.234 In his December 2010 address to the ASP, Prosecutor 
Moreno-Ocampo stated that “the Office is examining whether crimes under the jurisdiction of the 
 
231 See Section III above for discussion of how these durations were calculated. 
232 The Venezuela I preliminary examination is not included in this calculation since there is no information on when it 
was opened and, thus, no way to calculate its duration. 
233 Grotius Centre Report, supra note 6, at para. 18; Pues, supra note 10 at 440-41; Stahn, supra note 9, at 428. 
234 Côte d’Ivoire Request for Authorization, supra note 56, at para. 15. 
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Court exist” in the preliminary examination in Côte d’Ivoire, indicating that the OTP was still at the 
phase II assessment this late in the preliminary examination.235 And yet, the preliminary examination 
was concluded five-and-a-half months later when the Prosecutor informed the President of his 
intention to submit a request for authorization of an investigation.236 Thus, the bulk of the over seven-
and-a-half year long preliminary examination was spent determining the question of jurisdiction. By 
contrast, the rather quick complementarity assessment was made upon receipt of a letter to the 
Prosecutor from President Ouattara stating that “‘the Ivorian judiciary is not at this stage in the best 
position to address the most serious of the crimes’ committed since 28 November 2010, and ‘any 
attempt at trying the most responsible individuals may face multiple obstacles’.”237  
 
F. GEOGRAPHY  
One of the strongest and most consistent points of critique of the ICC is the perceived bias of the 
Court with respect to African states.  Assessing whether such bias exists would require a 
comprehensive comparison against unprosecuted grave crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction, which 
is beyond the scope of this paper. However, a geographical assessment of the content of the OTP’s 
preliminary examinations helps to nuance this critique and is also informative, because it provides a 
fuller picture of where the OTP has focused its efforts, and where it may be operating in the future. 
First, it is clear that the Court’s first twenty-seven preliminary examinations have primarily 
concerned conflict and mass violence in African states (Figure 6). Of the twenty-seven preliminary 
examinations that had been opened as at 30 November 2018: thirteen have concerned crimes allegedly 
 
235 Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, “Address to the Assembly of States Parties”, Ninth Session of the Assembly of States Parties, 
The Hague, 6 December 2010, online: <https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP9/Statements/ICC-ASP9-
statements-LuisMorenoOcampo-ENG.pdf> (accessed 21 October 2018) at 5. 
236 Côte d’Ivoire Request for Authorization, supra note 56, at para. 8. 
237 Ibid at para. 49.  
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committed solely in African states;238 four have concerned crimes allegedly committed solely in Latin 
American and Caribbean states;239 five have concerned crimes allegedly committed solely in Asia-
Pacific states;240 two have concerned crimes allegedly committed solely in Eastern European states;241 
one concerned crimes allegedly committed in  both Asia-Pacific and Eastern European states;242 one 
concerns crimes allegedly committed in both an Asia-Pacific and a state from the ‘Western European 
and Others Group’ (WEOG);243 and one involves an African state, an Asian-Pacific state, and a 
WEOG state.244 Based on the location of the alleged crimes, this brings the total number of preliminary 
examinations for each geographic region to: Africa (14), Asia-Pacific (8), Latin America and Caribbean 




238 Burundi, CAR I, CAR II, Côte d'Ivoire, Darfur, DRC, Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda.  
239 Colombia, Honduras, Venezuela I, and Venezuela II. 
240 Bangladesh/Myanmar, Iraq/UK, Palestine I, South Korea, and the Philippines. 
241 Georgia, and Ukraine 
242 In the ‘Afghanistan’ preliminary examination, the OTP analyzed crimes allegedly committed in Afghanistan, Poland, 
Lithuania, and Romania. 
243 In the ‘Palestine II’ preliminary examination, the OTP is analyzing crimes allegedly committed in Palestine and Israel, 
including rocket and mortar attacks allegedly launched from Palestine into Israel’s territory See 2016 Preliminary 
Examination Report, para. 123.  
244 In the ‘Comoros’ preliminary examination, the OTP analyzed crimes allegedly committed on vessels registered to 
Comoros, Cambodia, and Greece. 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Africa
Latin America & Caribbean
Asia-Pacific
Eastern Europe
Western Europe and Others
Figure 6: Number of preliminary examination by region, organized by state with 




To better understand the geographic spread of preliminary examinations, it is also relevant to 
consider the states of nationality of the alleged perpetrators (Figure 7).245 Thirteen preliminary 
examinations concern crimes allegedly committed by African nationals, once again making Africa the 
most represented region by a significant margin. Furthermore, the same four preliminary examinations 
that concern crimes allegedly committed in Latin America and Caribbean states also involve potential 
allegations against nationals from those same states. 
From there, the picture begins to change and the role of non-states parties becomes more 
visible. The number of preliminary examinations concerning WEOG states climbs from two to four 
(because the Palestine II and Comoros preliminary examinations both involve allegations against 
Israeli nationals, the Afghanistan preliminary examination involves allegations against nationals from 
the U.S., and the Iraq/UK preliminary examination involves allegations against UK nationals). The 
number of preliminary examinations concerning Asia-Pacific states drops from eight to five (the 
preliminary examination in South Korea involves allegations against North Koreans, the Philippines 
preliminary examinations involves allegations against nationals of that state, the Bangladesh/Myanmar 
preliminary examination involves allegations against nationals of Myanmar, and both the Palestine II 
and Afghanistan preliminary examinations involve allegations against nationals of those two states).246 
And the number of preliminary examinations concerning Eastern Europe drops from three to two, 
namely the Georgia preliminary examination (which included allegations against Georgian nationals 
 
245 No information about alleged perpetrators is available in relation to the Palestine I preliminary examination. 
246 This drop also reflects the fact that the Palestine I preliminary examination was counted for the purposes of assessing 
territorial jurisdiction but is excluded for the purposes of counting the states of nationality jurisdiction as no explicit 
information was given in that preliminary examination with respect to potential perpetrators. 
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and members of the Russian armed forces) and the Ukraine preliminary examination (which includes 
allegations against Ukrainian and members of the Russian armed forces).247 
Thus, the OTP has analyzed, or is currently analyzing, allegations against three permanent 
members of the UN Security Council (U.S., U.K., and Russia), as well as Israel, another powerful non-
party state (Russia and the U.S. are similarly not party to the ICC). This picture also reveals that the 
OTP has been more active in relation to WEOG states than much of the public commentary of the 
Court suggests, at least at the preliminary examination stage.  
 
Of course, the OTP’s preliminary examination work is only one piece of the Court’s overall 
work and most victims, perpetrators, and those evaluating and critiquing the Court will be more 
concerned with the actual investigations and prosecutions and the territories in relation to which they 
do or do not occur. It is beyond dispute that the OTP’s early investigations and prosecutions are 
heavily dominated by African states, with the first nine investigations opened relating to African 
nations. It was not until 2016 that the first preliminary examination proceeded to the opening of an 
 
247 Georgia Request for Authorization, supra note 52, at para. 2; 2017 PE Report, supra note 52, at paras 96-110. Note: In 
relation to Georgia, the OTP concluded that there was insufficient information to find a reasonable basis to believe that 
crimes were committed by members of the Russian armed forces. See Georgia Request for Authorization, Georgia 
Request for Authorization, supra note 52, at paras 208-211. 
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Figure 7: Number of preliminary examination by region, organized by state with 
nationality jurisdiction (as at 30 November 2018)
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investigation in relation to a non-African state in the situation in Georgia. This was followed, again, 
by an African state in the situation in Burundi. Most recently, reaching out of the African continent 
once more, the OTP has requested authorization to open an investigation in relation to the situation 
in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, a deeper look at all preliminary examinations helps to give a fuller picture 
of how the Court got to this place and also some indication of where it may be heading. 
Of the preliminary examinations that were closed with a decision not to proceed to an 
investigation, these include two in which the alleged crimes occurred in the Latin America and 
Caribbean region (Venezuela I and Honduras), two in which the alleged crimes occurred in the Asia-
Pacific region (South Korea and Palestine I), one in which the alleged crimes occurred in Africa 
(Gabon), and one in relation to crimes allegedly perpetrated on vessels from Africa, Asia, and WEOG, 
by WEOG (Israeli) nationals in the situation in Comoros. Finally, the preliminary examination 
involving allegations against WEOG nationals (UK) on the territory of an Asia-Pacific state (Iraq) was 
initially closed but subsequently re-opened. 
Of the current ongoing preliminary examinations: two relate to crimes allegedly committed in 
African states and by nationals of those states (Guinea and Nigeria); two relate to crimes allegedly 
committed in Latin American states and by nationals of those states (Colombia, Venezuela II); one 
relates to crimes allegedly committed in  Eastern Europe, by nationals of Eastern European states  
(Ukraine); two relate to crimes allegedly committed exclusively in Asia-Pacific states and by nationals 
of Asia-Pacific states (the Philippines and Bangladesh/Myanmar); one relating to nationals and the 
territory of both Asia-Pacific and WEOG (Palestine II); and the preliminary examination into crimes 
committed by WEOG nationals (UK) on Asia-Pacific (Iraq) territory has been “re-opened”. Thus, 
there is the potential for the Court to move in the direction of a somewhat more geographically diverse 
future of investigations and prosecutions with the Asia-Pacific region being the most prevalent region 





Thus far, we have presented findings based on individual criteria. However, when one considers 
correlations across several criteria, a more detailed picture emerges.  
 
1. Triggers and Outcomes  
For example, by considering the trigger and outcomes together, we can better assess the role that 
states, the Security Council, and other actors play in triggering the actions of the ICC (see Figure 8).248 
 
 
Both preliminary examinations triggered by Security Council resolutions resulted in the opening of 
investigations and, ultimately, the issuance of arrest warrants. Three of the five preliminary 
examinations triggered by state referrals also resulted in investigations being opened and arrest 
warrants being issued, the exceptions being the situations in Comoros and Gabon. The outcomes of 
 
248 See David Bosco, “Discretion and State Influence at the International Criminal Court: The Prosecutor’s Preliminary 
Examinations” (2017) 111:2 AJIL 395. 
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Fig 8: Triggers & outcomes for ICC preliminary examinations 
(as at 30 November 2018)
Concluded with decision to investigate Closed with decision not to investigate
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the preliminary examinations opened proprio motu have been far more varied. Of the four preliminary 
examinations initiated by the Prosecutor proprio motu upon receipt of an article 12(3) declaration, one 
proceeded to investigation (Côte d'Ivoire), one was closed without an investigation (Palestine I), and 
two are ongoing (Ukraine and Palestine II). Outcomes also vary significantly among preliminary 
examination opened proprio motu without an article 12(3) declaration. Three of these preliminary 
examinations were closed due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (Venezuela I, Honduras, and South 
Korea), a fourth was closed due to insufficient gravity but subsequently re-opened (Iraq/UK), six 
remain continuously ongoing (Bangladesh/Myanmar, Colombia, Guinea, Nigeria, the Philippines, and 
Venezuela II), and six have led to an investigation or a request to authorize an investigation 
(Afghanistan, Burundi, CAR II, DRC, Georgia, and Kenya). 
With respect to the preliminary examinations that concluded (whether with an investigation 
or with a decision not to proceed), a pattern in outcome has begun to emerge based on whether or 
not the trigger involved explicit consent of one or more states.249  To explain, both preliminary 
examinations triggered by the Security Council resulted in the opening of an investigation. 
Additionally, of the eight other situations in which the state in some way invited the Prosecutor to act 
(either by a state self-referral, an article 12(3) declaration, or a post hoc self-referral which indicates state 
consent after a preliminary examination was opened, even if it was not present initially), six (75%) 
resulted with a decision to proceed to an investigation.250  
 
249 By the term “explicit” state consent we seek to distinguish the situation of the state consent denoted by ratification of 
the Rome Statute in the first place.  
250 These six are: Uganda, CAR I, Mali (in which the preliminary examination was triggered by a state party referral); 
Côte d’Ivoire (in which the preliminary examination was triggered in response to an Article 12(3) declaration); and the 
DRC and CAR II (in which the Prosecutor received a post hoc state party referral after initiating a preliminary 
examination).  The remaining two preliminary examinations which involved explicit state consent, but which were closed 
without an investigation, are Comoros and Gabon. For the purposes of this analysis, the decision not to proceed in 
relation to the Palestine I preliminary examination is excluded because its attempted article 12(3) declaration was found 
to be invalid because there was no clear confirmation from the UN General Assembly of the statehood of Palestine at 
that time and, accordingly, it would be inaccurate to classify this as a situation involving “state” consent. 
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By contrast, of the concluded preliminary examinations that were triggered by the Prosecutor 
without explicit state consent, four have concluded with a decision to proceed to an investigation251 and 
three were closed due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.252 Thus, of the seven concluded 
preliminary examinations in this category, 57% resulted in a decision to proceed to an investigation. 
This discrepancy suggests that explicit state consent tends to somewhat increase the likelihood that 
the Prosecutor will seek authorization to proceed to an investigation. 
 
2. Triggers and Frequency  
 
* Iraq/UK and Venezuela I preliminary examinations closed in February 2006 but starting year unknown. 
** Nigeria and Honduras preliminary examinations made public in 2010 but actual starting dates unknown. 
**** Excludes Iraq/UK, which was ‘reopened’ in May 2014. 
 
As there have only been two Security Council referrals, not much can be said about their frequency. 
However, it is noteworthy that, despite the fact that neither referrals has resulted in a case that has 
 
251 Namely: Kenya, Afghanistan, Georgia, and Burundi 





Figure 9: Frequency & trigger for preliminary examinations 
(at at November 2018) 
UN Security Council referral state party referral
Prosecutor with Art. 12(3) declaration Prosecutor without Art. 12(3) declaration
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proceeded smoothly to trial,253 attempts have still been made to have further Security Council referrals 
(for example, in relation to Syria254 and Myanmar255). 
With respect to state referrals, there were a couple of referrals early on in the Court’s practice, 
followed by a lull in the receipt of state party referrals for a number of years between 2004 and 2012. 
This is even more apparent if one combines both the triggering state party referrals and the four post 
hoc referrals which occurred in 2004, 2014, and two in 2018.256 This gap may represent some hesitancy 
on the part of states after the initial burst of referrals to see how the Court’s work progressed as it 
actually began its first prosecutions, although there is no way to know for sure. It may also simply 
reflect the fact that the Prosecutor stopped being so active in seeking referrals. It is interesting, however, 
that the frequency of state party referrals has picked up again in recent years. This suggests that, despite 
the many criticisms levied at the Court, states are still willing to turn to the ICC. It is particularly 
noteworthy that of the six referrals submitted since 2012 (including post hoc referrals), four have come 
from African countries257 despite the general AU position of antipathy towards the Court, including 
threats of mass withdrawals.258 A somewhat similar pattern is apparent with article 12(3) declarations, 
with somewhat of a gap appearing after the Court’s initial years but with continuing use of this 
mechanism more recently as exhibited by the declarations submitted by Ukraine in 2014 and Palestine 
in 2015.  
 
253 See, e.g., Mark Kersten, “Buyer’s Beware – Is a UN Security Council Referral of Myanmar to the International 
Criminal Court a Good Idea” (31 August 2018) Justice in Conflict (blog), online: 
<https://justiceinconflict.org/2018/08/31/buyers-beware-is-a-un-security-council-referral-of-myanmar-to-the-
international-criminal-court-a-good-idea/> (accessed 31 August 2018). 
254 UN Press Release, “Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court Fails as Negative Votes Prevent Security Council 
from Adopting Draft Resolution”, 22 May 2014, available online: 
<https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11407.doc.htm> (accessed 18 August 2018). 
255 E.g., Human Rights Watch, “UN Security Council: Refer Myanmar to ICC”, 18 May 2018, online: 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/08/un-security-council-refer-myanmar-icc> (accessed 18 August 2018). 
256 We refer to the DRC’s post hoc referral in April 2004; the CAR’s second self-referral in May 2014, Palestine’s post hoc 
referral in May 2018, and the joint post hoc referral of Venezuela II in September 2018.   
257 Mali, Comoros, Gabon, and CAR. 
258 See, e.g., BBC News, “African Union backs mass withdrawal from ICC”, 1 February 2017, online: 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38826073> (accessed 18 August 2018). 
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With respect to preliminary examinations opened by the Prosecutor without article 12(3) 
declarations, the frequency pattern is different. After fairly consistent frequency of new preliminary 
examinations proprio motu in the Court’s early years and a spike in 2010, the frequency of such 
preliminary examinations tapered off for a number of years. This is not a reflection of a change in the 
submission of article 15 communications which has remained relatively consistent and have continued 
to come in high volumes each year.259 More likely, it is a question of resourcing: given that the OTP 
must work within a budget and cannot control when the next referral will come, there is a practical 
incentive for the Prosecutor to take a conservative approach to opening preliminary examinations 
proprio motu.  Having said that, the instigation of three new preliminary examinations on this basis in 
2018 indicates that the OTP remains responsive to reported crimes, even in the face of resource 
constraints.   
 
3. Triggers and Geography  
Considering the trigger when compared to the geography of different preliminary 
examinations is revealing and helps nuance some of the critiques of the court such as the alleged 
African bias. It is well known that the two Security Council referrals involve African states and that 
such referrals have been unsuccessful in relation to non-African countries. However, it is also 
noteworthy that all five preliminary examinations triggered by state party self-referrals concern crimes 
allegedly perpetrated in African states or on an African-flagged vessel,260 as did one of the preliminary 
examinations initiated in response to an Article 12(3) declaration (Côte d’Ivoire) and two preliminary 
examinations in which the states concerned made post hoc referrals (the DRC and CAR II). Thus, when 
one looks at the triggers for preliminary examinations  and investigations together, it is clear that many 
 
259 Grey and Wharton, supra note 5. 
260 Namely: Uganda, CAR I, Mali, Comoros and Gabon. The Comoros referral involves allegations against Israeli 
nationals and also potentially including the vessels registered to Cambodia and Greece. 
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African states have come have  “invited in” ICC activity, so to speak (although sometimes, in the early 
days, at the prompting of the Prosecutor).261 This state-led activity, together with the approach of the 
UN Security Council, has contributed to the ICC’s initials focus on the African continent.  
The OTP has played an important part in expanding the Court’s reach beyond Africa. Of the 
preliminary examinations triggered proprio motu without an article 12(3) declaration, six concern crimes 
allegedly committed in African states,262 four concern crimes committed in Latin America,263 two 
concern crimes committed in Eastern Europe,264 and five concern crimes committed in Asia-Pacific.265 
Additionally, two of these preliminary examinations involve allegations against nationals from two 
WEOG states, namely the US and UK.266 
 
4. Geography and Duration 
We also looked at the geography of preliminary examinations in relation to their duration. As 
noted above, both Security Council referrals were the two shortest preliminary examinations and both 
relate solely to African countries. This trend is repeated when looking at the four other preliminary 
examinations completed in less than a year which, again, include only African countries (DRC, 
Uganda, Mali, and CAR II). The Burundi, Kenya, Gabon and CAR I preliminary examinations were 
also relatively short, all concluding in less than two and a half years. The only other preliminary 
examination completed in less than two years was the situation in Comoros, involving allegations 
against Israeli nationals, which lasted just under a year and a half (although proceedings in relation to 
this preliminary examination were subsequently prolonged due to the request for reconsideration). In 
 
261 See notes 177 and 180, above. 
262 Namely: DRC, Kenya, Guinea, Nigeria, CAR II, and Burundi. 
263 Namely: Venezuela I, Colombia, Honduras, and Venezuela II.  
264 Namely: Georgia, and Afghanistan (which includes crimes allegedly committed by members of the CIA in Poland, 
Lithuania, and Romania).  
265 Namely: Afghanistan, Iraq/UK, Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Bangladesh/Myanmar.  
266 These two preliminary examinations are Afghanistan and Iraq/UK, respectively.  
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fact, including the Comoros preliminary examination (in which crimes were alleged to have been 
perpetrated on the territory of an African flagged vessel although allegations were against non-African 
nationals), the eleven shortest concluded preliminary examinations all involved African countries. The 
six completed preliminary examinations that took longest to conclude are more geographically diverse, 
including Palestine I, South Korea, Honduras, Georgia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Afghanistan. While there 
are many reasons why the Prosecutor may proceed quickly or slowly in any given preliminary 
examination, this paints an interesting picture in relation to critiques about the Court’s willingness to 
act in Africa as well as concerns about the prolonged wait for justice by victims in other regions. Thus, 
the Prosecutor would do well to explain why the OTP proceeded so quickly in some preliminary 
examinations and far more slowly in others. 
 
5. Triggers and Duration  
As has been observed elsewhere, the length of preliminary examinations vary with respect to the 
jurisdictional trigger.267 In particular, the two preliminary examinations triggered by UN Security 
Council referral are the shortest of all preliminary examinations. State party referrals clearly represent 
the second shortest category. The longest preliminary examination triggered by a state party referral is 
the situation in CAR I, which lasted for two years and five months, and all preliminary examinations 
triggered by state party referrals (which are all now concluded) lasted less than the average total length 
of 2.85 years.  Preliminary examinations triggered by article 12(3) declaration are generally lengthier, 
despite the fact that they also involve states inviting ICC intervention. The Palestine I preliminary 
examination took over three years to conclude that the declaration was invalid and, as mentioned 
above, the Côte d’Ivoire preliminary examination lasted close to eight years. 
 
267 Pues, supra note 10 at 437 & 439; Bosco, “Discretion and State Influence at the ICC”, supra note 248, at 401. 
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 Preliminary examinations opened by the Prosecutor without article 12(3) declarations include 
many of the lengthiest preliminary examinations, such as those in Colombia, Afghanistan, Guinea, 
Georgia, Nigeria, and Honduras. Three notable exceptions to this trend include the preliminary 
examination in Kenya, which was concluded in less than two years, the preliminary examination in 
Burundi, which took just over one year and three months, and the preliminary examination in the 
DRC, which lasted only approximately two-and-a-half months. It is notable that all three of these 
involve African states.  
In short, the average length of preliminary examinations268 based on the trigger has varied 
greatly, with only 33.5 days for Security Council resolutions, 510 days (just under a year and a half) for 
state party referrals, 1762 days (almost five years) for article 12(3) declarations, and 1666 days (just 
over four and a half years) for preliminary examinations opened proprio motu without an article 12(3) 
declaration.  
As Pues notes, this discrepancy is probably due in part to the fact that the OTP is unlikely to 
require a lengthy complementarity assessment in situations involving referrals.269 State parties will 
presumably only make referrals if their own judiciary is incapable of prosecuting the relevant case(s) 
domestically.270 For example, in its referral to the Court “the Malian authorities informed the Office 
that […] the Malian courts are unable to prosecute crimes”.271 Similarly, after referring the situation 
on its territory to the ICC, the Democratic Republic of Congo confirmed that there was no national 
case underway against the Germain Katanga in relation to the Bogoro attack, because “at the time of 
the crimes (February 2003) […] the DRC was unable genuinely to investigate the crimes’ and ‘since 
 
268 Based on best available information including some approximations as described in the Research Method section 
above. 
269 Pues, supra note 10, at paras 440-1. See also Bosco, “Discretion and State Influence at the ICC”, supra note 248, at 
405. 
270 One exception being Uganda. See Phil Clark, supra note 180, at 1202. 
271 2012 PE Report, supra note 56, at para. 182. 
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then the situation has shown little improvement.”272 Additionally, if the OTP receives a referral from 
either the Security Council or a state party (including a post hoc referral after the preliminary examination 
has been commenced), it does not need to prepare a submission requesting authorization of the 
investigation, which will shorten the preliminary examination considerably.  
Preliminary examinations will also likely proceed more quickly with state cooperation, which 
will often (but not always) be present where the situation was referred to the ICC by a state with 
jurisdiction over the alleged crimes.273 This raises a question as to why the preliminary examinations 
opened by the Prosecutor upon receipt of an Article 12(3) declaration, which works like a self-referral 
from a state that is not (yet) a party to the Rome Statute, have all been relatively lengthy  (the shortest 
being the Palestine I preliminary examination which took over three years). Furthermore, in some 
circumstances, preliminary examinations can be completed quickly even without cooperation from 
the relevant state. The OTP recently demonstrated this in relation to Burundi, in which a relatively 
swift preliminary examination resulted in a successful authorization to investigate, despite a lack of 
cooperation from the state and the inability of OTP staff to even enter the territory.274  
 At the end of the day, prioritization is inevitable due to limited resources of the Office. 
However, as commentators have rightly pointed out, the lack of transparency regarding how this 
prioritization is undertaken and the vastly differing timeframes among the preliminary examination 
inevitably creates room for critique.275 As Human Rights Watch has suggested, “when resource 
 
272 ICC, Observations of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the Challenge to Admissibility made by the Defence for Germain Katanga 
in the case of the Prosecutor versus Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Registry, 25 September 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07-
1497, page 4.  
273 Bosco, “Discretion and State Influence at the ICC”, supra note 248, at 406-7. 
274 Burundi Request for Authorization, supra note 166, at para. 27; Aljazeera, “UN commission: Burundi commits crimes 
against humanity”, 4 September 2017, available online: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/commission-
burundi-commits-crimes-humanity-170904133352582.html> (accessed 19 August 2018). 
275 Pues, supra note 10 at 436; Grotius Centre Report, supra note 6, at para. 32. 
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constraints factor into decisions about situations under analysis, the OTP should openly acknowledge 
that fact, lending increased transparency and credibility to OTP decision-making.”276 
 
6. Preliminary Examinations and Prosecutors 
As of 30 November 2018, Prosecutor Bensouda had only completed approximately 6.5 years (just 
over 72%) of her 9-year term. Even so, some initial comparison of the OTP’s preliminary 
examinations under the leadership of its two prosecutors is possible. During his nine-year term, Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo opened 17 preliminary examinations, ten of which (59%) were concluded by the 
end of his term. Of these ten, seven resulted in the opening of an investigation and three were closed 
with a decision not to proceed to an investigation (Venezuela I, Palestine I, and Iraq/UK). 
 Of the seven preliminary examinations that were opened by Moreno-Ocampo but not 
concluded as of the end of his term, three still remain continuously ongoing. These include the 
preliminary examinations in Colombia, Guinea, and Nigeria, which are among the longest running 
preliminary examinations to date. The Iraq/UK preliminary examination, which Bensouda “re-
opened” in 2014, also remains ongoing. Two preliminary examinations opened by Moreno-Ocampo 
were later closed by Bensouda, namely Honduras and South Korea. Two other preliminary 
examinations opened by Moreno-Ocampo concluded with a decision by Bensouda to proceed to an 
investigation (Georgia and Afghanistan). It is also noteworthy that all of the preliminary examinations 
inherited by Bensouda from Moreno-Ocampo’s tenure were opened proprio motu on the basis of article 
15 communications, whereas Moreno-Ocampo completed all preliminary examinations opened by 
state party referral, Security Council referral, and article 12(3) declaration before leaving office. 
 
276 Human Rights Watch, ‘ICC: Course Correction’, supra note 222. 
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 In total, by the end of Moreno-Ocampo’s term, seven277 out of seventeen PEs resulted in a 
decision to proceed to an investigation, three278 were closed with a decision not to proceed to an 
investigation (although one of these, namely Iraq/UK, was subsequently “re-opened”), and another 
seven279 remained underway”).  
 The Court’s second prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, took office on 15 June 2012. During her 
term, the OTP has opened ten new preliminary examinations,280 “re-opened” the Iraq/UK preliminary 
examination, and continued work on the seven preliminary examinations inherited from Moreno-
Ocampo. This brings the number of preliminary examinations worked on during Bensouda’s term to 
date to eighteen which has already surpassed the total number during her predecessor’s term. In 
relation to outcomes of preliminary examinations during Bensouda’s term, as of 30 November 2018, 
four have led to investigations,281 a fifth (Afghanistan) will potentially proceed to investigation pending 
the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision, four have been closed without an investigation,282 and nine are 
ongoing.283 That breakdown may change by the end of Prosecutor Bensouda’s term, which will end in 




This comprehensive analysis of the OTP’s preliminary examinations adds a much needed “birds-eye 
view” to the rapidly growing scholarship on this important area of the ICC’s work. It gives a sense of 
 
277 Namely: CAR I, Côte d'Ivoire, Darfur, DRC, Kenya, Libya, and Uganda. 
278 Namely: Iraq/UK, Palestine I, and Venezuela I. 
279 Namely: Afghanistan, Colombia, Georgia, Guinea, Honduras, Nigeria, and South Korea. 
280 Namely: Bangladesh/Myanmar, Burundi, CAR II, Comoros, Gabon, Mali, Palestine II, the Philippines, Ukraine, 
Venezuela II. 
281 Namely: Burundi, CAR II, Georgia, and Mali. 
282 Namely: Comoros, Gabon, Honduras, and South Korea. 




the major energy expended by the OTP at this very early stage of proceedings, enables a more 
informed assessment of where the ICC has been most active and why, and gives an indication of where 
the Court’s work may be heading in the future.  
The paper has also identified a number of points on which further research is warranted that 
are beyond the scope of this analysis, in particular in relation to many substantive points of law. As 
shown above, the OTP’s analysis at the preliminary examinations stage spans a wide range of legal 
issues, and functions almost as a mini-jurisprudence in its own right. For example, the statute’s gravity 
threshold has been considered in detail by the OTP and Pre-Trial Chamber in the Comoros 
preliminary examination. Similarly, a look at the Honduras, Venezuela I, and Gabon preliminary 
examinations may shed light on the OTP’s analysis of the application of the contextual elements of 
crimes against humanity and the South Korea preliminary examination contains the OTP’s first 
interpretation of the war crime of “perfidy” (i.e. killing or wounding treacherously), which is currently 
also being considered in the preliminary examination in Ukraine. As well, the South Korea preliminary 
examination contains a critical jurisdictional determination by the OTP which it referenced in its recent 
application seeking a jurisdictional ruling in relation to allegations of deportation of Rohingya people 
from Myanmar to Bangladesh that has recently garnered significant attention.284  
Ongoing preliminary examinations also give considerable insight into the OTP’s “positive 
complementarity” efforts, and may shed light on the largely unexamined concept of the “interests of 
justice”. It is also worth keeping an eye on current preliminary examinations where the Prosecutor is 
examining crimes not previously given consideration before the Court such as allegations of gender-
based persecution in both the Afghanistan and Nigeria preliminary examinations. The importance of 
these issues suggest that this largely over-looked body of analysis deserves closer attention. Finally, it 
 
284 ICC-OTP, Application under Regulation 46(3), “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of 
the Statute”, 9 April 2018, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-1 at para. 14. 
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is also hoped that this work will provide fruit for further reflection, debate, and comparison as the 
OTP’s work progresses and as new prosecutors take the helm. 
  
